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Abstract 
Global climate change is a theme that has been widely discussed and studied in many 
areas due to its potential impact on natural and human systems. Issues such as 
vulnerability, adaptation and mitigation has been taken by several sectors, among which 
the energy sector. In the world, the energy sector is a major contributor for the climatic 
change phenomenon, although it is also one of the most affected by it, especially the 
renewable sources. In fact, the energy usage often results in greenhouse gases emissions, 
affecting climate in such way that deteriorates the potential of renewables generation. As 
less renewables mean more emissions, this cycle needs to be interrupted. 
This thesis is an analysis of the use of smart grid technologies to mitigate and adapt the 
electrical sector to the climate impacts projected for the coming years. The proposed 
methodology uses projected impacts of climate and smart grids to predict energy 
generation and greenhouse gas emissions. This proposal is illustrated by a case study on 
the Brazilian electric sector that has a particularity of having interconnections between its 
four subsystems, which allows for the exchange of energy and better utilization of the 
different hydrological cycles in the country, and already has a large share of renewables. 
The results show that smart grids can help to save energy, reduce the operational and 
maintenance costs and the investments in new power plants after 2030. Smart grid would 
also help to reduce electricity tariffs, the generation costs and the costs associated with 
theft and fraud. The best results were achieved for the scenarios that involve the 
combination of smart grids with the promotion of efficiency and consumers’ 
consciousness in energy issues. 
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Resumo 
As mudanças climáticas globais são um tema muito comentado e estudado por diversas 
áreas devido a como este evento irá afetar os sistemas naturais e humanos. Questões como 
vulnerabilidade, adaptação e mitigação vêm sendo levantadas por diversos sectores, 
dentre eles o setor energético. No mundo, o setor energético é um dos maiores 
responsáveis pelo fenômeno climático, entretanto, é, também, um dos mais afetados, em 
especial as fontes renováveis. De fato, o uso de energia geralmente resulta em emissões 
de gases de efeito estufa, afetando o clima de tal maneira que deteriora o potencial da 
geração de renováveis. Como menos renováveis significam mais emissões, esse ciclo 
precisa ser interrompido. 
Esta tese apresenta uma análise do uso da tecnologia de redes inteligentes para mitigar e 
adaptar o setor elétrico aos impactos climáticos projetados para os próximos anos. A 
metodologia proposta utiliza projeções climáticas e do impacto das redes inteligentes para 
projetar a geração de energia e emissão de gases de efeito estufa. Tal proposta é ilustrada 
com um estudo de caso sobre o sector elétrico brasileiro que tem uma particularidade de 
ter interconexões entre seus quatro subsistemas, que permite o intercâmbio de energia 
entre as regiões e uma melhor utilização dos diferentes ciclos hidrológicos no país, e já 
possuir uma grande participação de renováveis. 
Os resultados mostram que as smart grids (redes inteligentes) podem ajudar a reduzir o 
uso de energia, reduzir os custos operacionais e de manutenção e os investimentos em 
novas usinas a serem construídas após 2030. As smart grids também ajudariam a reduzir 
as tarifas de eletricidade, os custos de geração e os custos associados ao roubo e à fraude. 
Os melhores resultados foram alcançados para os cenários que envolvem a combinação 
de smart grids com a promoção da eficiência e consciência energética.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
In 2015, the renewable participation in the Brazilian Energy Sector, according to National 
Energy Balance (BEN) (EPE/MME 2016), was approximately 41,2%, and about 75,5% 
in the Electric Sector.  
Renewable energy sources are, on the one hand, an alternative to the mitigation of global 
climate change but, on the other hand, because they are dependent on weather conditions, 
the resulting production is intermittent or uncertain and, they can potentially suffer the 
effects of climate change (Schaeffer et al. 2008; Lucena, Schaeffer, and Szklo 2012a). 
Furthermore, BEN’s reports (EPE/MME 2016) confirm that the renewable energy 
sources were decreasing its participation in the electricity mix since the end of the 1990’s 
and more strongly since 2011. This is due, especially, to the decrease in hydropower 
generation (water scarcity) and the necessity to compensate it with an increase in the 
thermoelectric generation. 
The change in the electric mix led to the increase in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
which causes higher GHG concentration in the atmosphere potentiates climate changes – 
extreme events, temperature change, precipitation change and etcetera. So, the 
vulnerability of the electricity generation in a country, where the production mix depends 
on the climate, is also expected to increase. 
According to Energy Economy Group (GEE) (GEE n.d.), the development of the national 
energy mix was characterized by a high share of renewable energy sources (hydropower 
and biomass) in a competitive context but these attributes have been questioned in the last 
years. The recent energy sector context reveals greater difficulty to merge the attributes 
of clean and competitive energy and security of supply.  
Finally, in what concerns electricity supply, the development of the Brazilian industry has 
been historically based on two pillars: hydraulic energy efficiency with large reservoirs, 
coordinated by state-owned enterprises; and the consolidation of this model allowed the 
electricity supply to become a competitive factor for the Brazilian economy, in terms of 
price and reliability (Bicalho GEE 2013). 
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However, the depletion of the most competitive water dams and the restrictions on the 
construction of new hydroelectric reservoirs imposed a limit to this model. Nevertheless, 
as the operating rules and planning were maintained, the pillars that supported the 
previous model are no longer sufficient to meet the reliability and affordability objectives 
(Bicalho GEE 2013). 
Currently, the electric energy system, although based essentially on hydroelectric 
reservoirs, cannot attend the demand if it only uses the thermoelectric plants in critical 
moments. This became clear in 2012, when the electricity rationing fears returned to haunt 
the industry (Bicalho GEE 2013). The Smart Grid (SG) paradigm promises ubiquitous 
monitoring and control of the entire electric power system, providing optimized 
management and a deeper exploitation of the infrastructure. The main objective of the 
present work is to anticipate the potential benefits of SG as an adaptation and mitigation 
strategy considering the impacts of climate change in the electricity sector. 
Motivation 
The climate is always changing. However, in the last few decades, human activity has 
been intensifying this natural process by adding more GHG into the atmosphere. The 
electricity sector is one of the main responsible for those changes and the renewable 
generation is seen as a way to mitigate the associated effects. In Brazil, the power sector 
has been mainly renewable, almost since its creation, but the systems with large share of 
renewables are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change.  
Thus, the hydro generation has been decreasing due to unfavorable hydrological 
conditions and the thermal generation has been increasing to supply the demand. 
Therefore, the GHG emissions per MWh produced escalated during the last years. 
Smart Grid technologies may help to adapt the power sector to the observed changes and 
mitigate the emissions caused by the use of non-renewable sources. If smart grid shows 
itself as able to mitigate the GHG emission in the Brazilian power sector and adapt the 
sector to the observed effects, it would contribute to reduce the changes in the climate, 
the amount of gases in the atmosphere and increase the security of supply and the 
renewable sources participation in power generation. It could also reduce the peak load, 
the power system exploitation costs and the network losses. 
18 
 
Thus, the following research problem and questions were established to help clarifying 
the main research goal and identifying the main troubling questions linked to this 
challenge. 
Main Research Question 
Can smart grids be used to mitigate the observed climate change and to adapt the power 
industry in Brazil to the forecasted climate scenarios for 2030? 
Auxiliary Questions 
How are the Brazilian’s power sector generation and consumption situations in 2015? 
How demographic and climate variables are expected to evolve in Brazil until 2030? 
How is the competitiveness of energy supply in Brazil in the context of restrictions posed 
by climate change? 
How is the status of security of energy supply in Brazil nowadays and how it is expected 
to be in the next 15 years? 
Is it necessary to reduce diversification of electric low carbon emission renewable sources 
within the new context of climate change and increase the thermoelectric participation in 
the electric energy mix to guarantee the security of the electric energy supply? 
What is the expected impact of smart grids in the power sector in Brazil? 
What are the expected impacts of other adaptations and mitigations strategies in the power 
sector with and without the use of smart grids? 
Goals 
In order to assess the smart grid’s potential to mitigate the GHG emission and adapt the 
power sector to the expected effects of climate change, the following general and specific 
goals were defined. 
a. General 
Estimate the possible contributions of the smart grids to reduce the vulnerability of the 
power sector to climate change in the projected future scenarios in order to assess its 
potential as mitigation and adaptation strategy in Brazilian electric energy industry. 
19 
 
b. Specifics 
Describe and analyze the Brazilian energy crisis, which is not a recent issue and is not 
essentially related with climate change, in order to create better forecast scenarios and 
explore the use of smart grids in other issues related with the electric energy crisis beyond 
the climate change. 
Apply the IPCC’s (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) forecast scenarios 
considering the Brazilian 2030 energy mix, aiming at analyzing the vulnerability of the 
electric energy supply, considering the planed evolution of the sector, the forecasted 
evolution of some demographic variables and the evolution scenarios of climate change. 
Evaluate how other adaptations and mitigations strategies are expected to affect the power 
sector with and without the use of smart grids, in order to analyze the synergy between 
those actions. 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The Chapter I presents an introduction for the 
research, the motivation to start it and the research goals, general and specific.  
The Chapter II contains the literature review about the climate change, how it affects the 
electric system, and how smart grids technology can be used to make the sector more 
efficient. 
Chapter III presents the methodology used to measure the impact of smart grids as a 
mitigation and adaptation strategy. 
The case study for the Brazilian power sector is presented in the Chapter IV. 
Finally, Chapter V concludes the thesis and presents recommendations for future work. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The climate change impact and the smart grid’s effect on the power sector has been the 
main subject of many researches all over the globe. This chapter aims to contextualize 
and present the literature review on the state of the art of climate change, power sector 
vulnerability, mitigation, adaptation and smart grid. 
Climate Change 
The Earth’s climate is always changing as a result of natural processes, e.g., variation in 
the Earth’s orbit, volcanic eruptions and changes in solar radiation. Even if all these 
processes were constant, variability on climate system (such as drought periods or floods) 
would still exist. This changeability , between seasons or centuries, is natural, i.e., one 
can never expect a year or decade equal to the previous one (Marengo et al. 2011). This 
happen because there is an internally and externally induced climate variability. The 
externally induced climate variability concerns to variations in the atmosphere, oceans, 
solar radiation and so forth, “but even without changes in external forcing, the climate 
may vary naturally, because, in a system of components with very different response 
times and non-linear interactions, the components are never in equilibrium and are 
constantly changing” (IPCC. WGI, 2015). 
Weather and climate have a profound influence on life on Earth from being a part of the 
daily experience of human beings to being essential for health, food production and well-
being. Based on the relevance of weather and climate on these subjects many scientists 
consider the prospect of human-induced climate change as a matter of concern (IPCC, 
2001). 
This work adopts the IPCC definitions of weather, climate, climate change, adaptation 
and mitigation (Table 1). 
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Table 1: Main climate related concepts 
Term Description 
Weather 
“is the fluctuating state of the atmosphere around us, characterized by the temperature, wind, 
precipitation, clouds and other weather elements. This weather is the result of rapidly 
developing and decaying weather systems such as mid-latitude low and high-pressure 
systems with their associated frontal zones, showers and tropical cyclones.” (Page 87, IPCC 
2001, WGII) 
Climate 
“in a narrow sense is usually defined as the average weather, or more rigorously, as the 
statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period 
of time ranging from months to thousands or millions of years. The classical period for 
averaging these variables is 30 years, as defined by the World Meteorological Organization. 
The relevant quantities are most often surface variables such as temperature, precipitation, 
and wind. Climate in a wider sense is the state, including a statistical description, of the 
climate system.” (Page 1760, IPCC 2014, WGII) 
Climate 
Change 
“refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical 
tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an 
extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal 
processes or external forcing such as modulations of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions, 
and persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use. 
Note that the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in its Article 1, 
defines climate change as ‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to 
human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition 
to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.’ The UNFCCC thus 
makes a distinction between climate change attributable to human activities altering the 
atmospheric composition, and climate variability attributable to natural causes.  (Page 1760, 
IPCC 2014, WGII) 
Mitigation 
“Mitigation of climate change is human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the 
sinks of greenhouse gases. And Mitigation of disaster risk and disaster is the lessening of 
the potential adverse impacts of physical hazards (including those that are human-induced) 
through actions that reduce hazard, exposure, and vulnerability.” (Page 1769, IPCC 2014, 
WGII) 
Adaptation 
“is the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human systems, 
adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In some 
natural systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its 
effects.” (Page 1758, IPCC 2014, WGII) 
“Incremental adaptation – adaptation actions where the central aim is to maintain the essence 
and integrity of a system or process at a given scale.” (Page 1758, IPCC 2014, WGII) 
“Transformational adaptation – adaptation that changes the fundamental attributes of a 
system in response to climate and its effects.” (Page 1758, IPCC 2014, WGII) 
“Autonomous adaptation – adaptation in response to experienced climate and its effects, 
without planning explicitly or consciously focused on addressing climate change. Also 
referred to as spontaneous adaptation.” (Page 1759, IPCC 2014, WGII) 
“Anticipatory adaptation – adaptation that takes place before impacts of climate change are 
observed. Also referred to as proactive adaptation.” (Page 869, IPCC 2007, WGII) 
“Planned adaptation – adaptation that is the result of a deliberate policy decision, based on 
an awareness that conditions have changed or are about to change and that action is required 
to return to, maintain, or achieve a desired state.” (Page 869, IPCC 2007, WGII) 
Source: Adapted from IPCC 
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Furthermore, to work with climate change issues it is necessary to anticipate the most 
likely future climate scenarios.  Adequate climate models are required to make reliable 
future climate projections, of not only how the average global temperature may increase 
in the twenty-first century, but also of how these changes can affect climate worldwide 
(Marengo et al. 2011). 
Climate models are described, by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO n.d.), 
as a mathematical representation of the climate and, “in order to be able to do this, the 
models divide the earth, ocean and atmosphere into a grid. The values of the predicted 
variables, such as surface pressure, wind, temperature, humidity and rainfall are 
calculated at each grid point over time, to predict their future values.” 
Moreover, according to Marengo et al. (2011), in this grid, the mathematical model makes 
calculations based on well-established laws of physics that describe the movement of air, 
changes in atmospheric pressure, temperature and the formation of rain, i.e., the climate 
and the weather. However, Marengo et al. (2011)  emphasizes that it is not possible to 
represent all the details that exist in the real world, and therefore, certain processes must 
be included in the model by means of approximations based on expert knowledge. 
Additionally, the level of detail of the grid is directly related with the computational time, 
“the finer the resolution the shorter the interval between each computation” (WMO n.d.) 
and the complex level of the models used in climate research can “range from simple 
energy balance models to complex Earth System Models (ESM) requiring state of the art 
high-performance computing, so, the choice of model depends directly on the scientific 
question being addressed” (Held, 2005; Collins et al., 2006 apud IPCC 2013). 
In what concerns the evaluation of the model, according to PBMC (Brazilian Panel on 
Climate Change) (2014a), climate models are evaluated for their ability to simulate the 
current climate and the past with respect to average conditions and its variations. If a 
model can adequately simulate the climate from the twentieth century to the present, then 
would be expected that future climate projections could be considered plausible (Marengo 
et al. 2011). 
However, the complexity of the climate system makes it very difficult to forecast, 
particularly in the long term. Some of the reasons for this, according to Marengo et al. 
(2011), are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Types of uncertainty 
Type of 
uncertainty 
Description 
Uncertainty on 
emissions 
It is not possible to predict changes in emissions of greenhouse gases in the future. 
That depends on various socioeconomic factors, including demographic changes, the 
composition of energy sources in the future and the course of development. 
Greenhouse 
gas 
concentrations 
Emissions do not match simply the concentrations present in the atmosphere. Carbone 
dioxide does not undergo chemical reactions in the atmosphere, which means they 
have relatively long life and is eliminated only by "sinks" of carbon - the oceans and 
vegetation. Therefore, the projection of future concentrations of greenhouse gases 
depends of past emissions, as well as of the future, the modelling of flows, carbon 
“sinks” and how they can change. 
Natural 
variability of 
weather and 
climate 
The weather system is chaotic by nature, which means it is very sensitive to small 
changes that cannot be anticipated. The way natural variations develop into a model 
depends heavily on the initial conditions used in the model; it is not possible to know 
perfectly. However, as we move into the next century, the exact starting point ceases 
to be important with respect to climate change caused by increased concentration of 
greenhouse gases. 
Uncertainty of 
modeling 
The knowledge and understanding of the climate system and the ability to model it are 
limited. Different models - for example, with different grid settings or input parameters 
- provide different magnitudes and climate change patterns. Likewise, changes in the 
representation of the modelling process can create different future climate scenarios. 
Source: Adapted from Marengo et al. (2011) 
Table 2 presented some uncertainties related to climate models and prediction, however, 
it is important to emphasize that the uncertainty will always be there. It can be exemplified 
by an observation made by Soito and Freitas (2011, 6). 
“Projections for climate change on a regional level in terms of water resources, 
that is, predictions related to anomalies in rainfall on drainage basins in 
Brazilian territory, vary markedly from one model to the other. For example, 
according to the models from the Hadley Center (England), variations in 
average surface flow projected for 2050 in the Paraná river basin, assuming an 
increase of 1% in CO2 concentration, appear as positive in the HadCM3 model 
(+50 to 150 mm/year in the basin’s margins) and as negative in the HadCM2 
(−50 to 150 mm/year in the basin’s margins). The models are more ambiguous 
in the Southern Hemisphere due to its hydro meteorological observation 
network being smaller and more recently established than that of the Northern 
Hemisphere.” 
Besides the models, climate change projections also require information about future 
emissions and concentrations of greenhouse gas, aerosols and other climate drivers. This 
information is often expressed as a scenario of human activities (IPCC WGI 2013). 
The IPCC (2000) define scenarios as “alternative images of how the future might unfold” 
and say that they “are an appropriate tool with which to analyze how driving forces may 
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influence future emission outcomes and to assess the associated uncertainties.” (WMO 
n.d.) 
Thus, the scenarios “assist in climate change analysis, including climate modelling and 
the assessment of impacts, adaptation, and mitigation” (WMO n.d. and IPCC 2000). 
However, it is highly improbable that any single emissions path will occur as described 
in the scenarios (WMO n.d. and IPCC 2000). 
The most recent group of scenarios presented by IPCC in the Assessment Report (AR) 5, 
are known as Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP). “Four RCP were selected 
and defined by their total radiative forcing (cumulative measure of human emissions of 
GHGs from all sources expressed in Watts per square meter) pathway and level by 2100. 
The RCPs were chosen to represent a broad range of climate outcomes, based on a 
literature review, and are neither forecasts nor policy recommendations” IPCC (2015). 
However, the most referred scenarios in the literature are the IPCC ones, namely the AR4 
scenarios from 2007, probably because the AR5 scenarios, from 2013, are still very 
recent. The IPCC’s Assessment Reports are defined as “published materials composed of 
the full scientific and technical assessment of climate change, generally in three volumes, 
one for each of the Working Groups1 of the IPCC, together with their Summaries for 
Policymakers, plus a Synthesis Report” (IPCC, 2015).  
The AR4 scenarios, which are explained in more detail in Chapter III, had revealed 
themselves efficient to predict future climate when comparing historic values with the 
various IPCC SRES scenarios, as this group of scenarios has been used since 2000. 
Moreover, in the literature, the use of the scenarios A2 and B2 of the IPCC to make 
simulations and projections for local / regional areas, and the use of the baseline period 
from 1961 to 1990 to compare it with seems as standard.  
Furthermore, the use of the scenarios A2 and B2 (and exclusion of scenarios A1 and B1) 
can be explained by the fact that, according to Bicalho (GEE n.d.), climate changes and 
                                                          
1“The IPCC Working Group I (WG I) assesses the physical scientific aspects of the climate system and 
climate change. The IPCC Working Group II (WG II) assesses the vulnerability of socio-economic and 
natural systems to climate change, negative and positive consequences of climate change, and options 
for adapting to it. The IPCC Working Group III (WG III) assesses options for mitigating climate change 
through limiting or preventing greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing activities that remove them from 
the atmosphere.” (IPCC n.d.) 
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GHG reduction are global problems but the solution is local as it depends on national 
policies, available resources, technologies, institutions, and other aspects which differ 
from a country or region to another. 
However, this idea is not consensual, as pointed by von Stechow et al. (2015). Mitigation 
is a global common problem but will not be achieved if climate policies are “formulated 
at national and even subnational levels, because, there, many of the non-climate 
objectives are often more salient as policy drivers”. However, “co-benefits of mitigation 
hold the prospect of helping to achieve some of these other objectives and reducing the 
short-term costs of climate policies that accrue on the local/national level”. 
As presented, the climate is changing as a result of human activity and impacts are 
expected all over the globe. 
Vulnerability to climate change 
The impacts resulting from changes in climate are directly connected to the vulnerability 
to which natural and human systems are exposed (Soito and Freitas 2011). The climate 
change can be observed in many places and the following list and Figure 1 from IPCC 
(2015, p 40, 41) presents some of the perceived changes: 
• Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface 
than any preceding decade since 1850. The period from 1983 to 2012 was very 
likely the warmest 30-year period of the last 800 years in the Northern 
Hemisphere, where such assessment is possible (high confidence) and likely the 
warmest 30-year period of the last 1400 years; 
• Ocean warming dominates the increase in energy stored in the climate system, 
accounting for more than 90% of the energy accumulated between 1971 and 2010) 
with only about 1% stored in the atmosphere; 
• Over the last two decades, the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have been losing 
mass. Glaciers have continued to shrink almost worldwide (high confidence). 
Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover has continued to decrease in extent. 
There is high confidence that there are strong regional differences in the trend in 
Antarctic sea ice extent, with a very likely increase in total extent; 
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• Over the period 1901–2010, global mean sea level rose by 0.19 [0.17 to 0.21] m 
(Figure 1). The rate of sea level rise since the mid-19th century has been larger 
than the mean rate during the previous two millennia. 
 
Figure 1: Multiple observed indicators of a changing global climate system 
Source: IPCC 2015 
As seen above, climate change can affect many sectors - such as health, food production 
(frost-free season and growing season are expected to lengthen), etc. – and will have an 
impact on human well-being. One of the main sectors that will be affected by climate 
change is the energy sector and its vulnerability to this event is addressed in the next topic. 
Energy Sector Vulnerability 
The literature review presented in this document maintain it is very likely that climate 
change is due to human activities related to GHG emission. According to the European 
Climate Foundation (ECF) (2014),  in what concerns the energy sector, in general, it will 
be affected in different ways by climate change: 
27 
 
• Increase in the demand: greater demand for cooling, economic growth and the 
rising global population; 
• Extreme events: disruption and production shutdowns in the oil and gas industry; 
• Sea level rising: power plants in coastal areas, oil and gas offshore facilities; 
• Storms: will affect electric grids and generation; 
• Rise in global temperature: will affect generation, thermal and hydro power 
stations; 
• Weather changes: may affect bioenergy crops. 
According to IPCC (2014) “climate change involves complex interconnections and 
changing likelihoods of diverse impacts” and “susceptibility to climate change differs 
across sectors and regions” (IPCC, 2001). 
The energy industry is considered the biggest contributor to climate change, but it is also 
the one that will suffer the most with its effects.  
The impacts of climate change will not be equally distributed among regions and 
populations. Individuals, sectors and systems can be affected in different intensities 
according to geographical location, weather, social, economic and environmental 
conditions and infra-structure (Soito and Freitas 2011). 
According to ECF et al. (2014), “three climate-change phenomena will have a particular 
impact on the energy sector: global warming, changing regional weather patterns 
(including hydrological patterns) and an increase in extreme weather events”. However, 
while most climate change’s impacts are likely to be negative, a few positive effects might 
also emerge, such as lower energy demand in cold climates (ECF et al. 2014). 
The power sector, in particular, will be affected all over the world and, according to 
McConnach, Zobaa, and Lapp (2011), it is facing challenges to make the transition to 
renewable and sustainable sources, to grow the use of smart grid’s technology, meet the 
growing demand, maintaining the service reliable and price competitive, among others. 
Renewable energy is more vulnerable, due to its dependence to weather and climate. 
However, fossil energy supply technologies, though relatively less susceptible to 
variations in environmental conditions, are not totally free from eventual impacts from 
climate change (Schaeffer et al. 2012). 
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So, all energy sources can be affected. Nevertheless, there is a relationship that must be 
studied with more attention when analyzing the energy sector’s vulnerability: the energy 
and water relationship, which will be discussed in the next topic. 
Hydric Crisis 
Finally, the last problem to be addressed in this section is the relationship between water 
and energy and how it would be affected in the future. The current necessity to reduce the 
energy consumption and the carbon emissions make this relationship a global issue, 
especially because a huge amount of water is used to produce energy and the energy is 
also necessary for water supply and water treatment (Anjos, Rocha, and Andrade, 2014). 
In addition, water is required for the generation, operation, processing and transport of 
fossil fuels. It is also used for drilling and fracturing in oil and gas exploration, in cooling 
systems for power plants, production of electricity in hydroelectric plants and the 
cultivation of the raw materials used to produce biofuels, which require high amount of 
water to be obtained (Anjos et al., 2014). i.e., the water is related with the production of 
almost all the energy transformation forms. 
However, the amount of water available is limited. “There are approximately 1,386x106 
km3 of water found on Earth; however, 97% is saline, and 99.7% of the freshwater is 
trapped in ice caps and glaciers, or found in groundwater, which requires energy for 
removal, leaving 0.1 million km3 aboveground in lakes, swamps and rivers, and about 
13x103 km3 in the atmosphere” (Mcmahon and Prince, 2011). 
Furthermore, the “surface water has not increased for the past 20 years, and 
simultaneously, groundwater tables have been dropping. Currently, 700 million people 
around the world face water scarcity, and by 2025, that number is expected to increase to 
1.8 billion people” (Mcmahon and Prince, 2011). 
As the literature points out, the water issue can be very serious, not only for the energy 
sector. Therefore, because of these and all the previous points addressed, mitigation and 
adaptations strategies should be a priority, especially for the energy sector, to assure its 
reliability during the time to come. Thus, the next topic will address such strategies. 
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Mitigation and adaptation to climate change in electric sector 
After addressing all the observed problems, this section will address the mitigation and 
adaptations efforts to deal with the climate change. 
It is well known that the negative effects of climate change can be very damaging for the 
economy and environment, though,  according to Bernauer’s (2013) research on climate 
change policy making, problem solving presents itself as being much harder than many 
practitioners and scientists initially expected.  
The challenge in solving the climate change problem starts with the fact that “climate 
change mitigation is a global collective good (sometimes also called a global common 
pool resource) whose ‘production’ requires global collective action”2 (Bernauer 2013). 
However, as the observed climate change is due to the GHG emissions in the past, it is 
attributed to the richest and developed countries with large GHG emissions. On the other 
hand, as pointed by Bernauer (2013) they are likely to suffer least from climatic changes 
because they have a higher capacity for adaptation.  
“They have an incentive to invest in adaptation measures, rather than in 
mitigation, because the investing country can directly appropriate the benefits 
of adaptation. Developing countries, in contrast, are much more likely to suffer 
from climatic changes because of their smaller capacity for adaptation. Yet, 
even if they reduced their economic growth to zero, they could not (with the 
exception of China, India, and Brazil) contribute in a significant way to solving 
the problem. And those large emerging economies whose commitment to 
major GHG reductions is essential have a different social rate of time 
preference (discount rate) than mature industrialized economies: they prefer to 
grow first and “clean up” later” (Spilker 2012 apud Bernauer 2013) 
                                                          
2 A similar situation had happened during the 1980s, a global environmental problem with somewhat 
similar geophysical properties: the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer. Emissions of ozone-
depleting chemicals worldwide had, similar to the climate problem, changed the composition of the 
atmosphere. In the ozone case, the thinning of the stratospheric ozone layer leads to increased UV 
radiation, which in turn is detrimental to agricultural production and human health. Within 10 years, an 
effective global regime was established, and the ozone layer is likely to be back at its preindustrial level 
within the next few decades. The global ozone regime is based on a framework convention established in 
1985, a protocol established in 1987, and a series of amendments to this protocol. However, “in the ozone 
case, the benefits of solving the problem were very substantial and easy to communicate to the public 
(e.g., less skin cancer and less damage to agriculture); the overall costs of solving the problem were orders 
of magnitude smaller (a few billion US dollars, compared to hundreds of billions of dollars or more in the 
climate case). In the ozone case, the problem was solved through a shift to alternative chemicals. This 
substitution brought some additional economic benefit to a few large firms accounting for a large share 
of global production of the relevant chemicals. The substitution costs, which per capita were very low, 
were imposed on consumers. Consequently, the industry concerned eventually welcomed the proposed 
solution, and the additional per capita costs to consumers were too small to provoke enough opposition 
to stop the policy” (Bernauer 2013, 425) 
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On the other hand, GHG emissions from the developing countries are rising faster than 
those from other countries, and it would not be possible to stabilize climate change 
without reducing the growth of these emissions but, the main issue is to mitigate the 
climate change without reducing the development of those countries (Sathaye and 
Ravindranath 1998) 
According to Sandler and Thompson (2004 and 2006 apud Bernauer 2013), the climate 
problem can be compared with the prisoner’s dilemma which, “in the climate case also 
corresponds to the tragedy-of-the-commons logic, is an impediment to global problem 
solving, that is, global collective action”. 
According to Soito and Freitas (2011), adaptation is an important factor in climate change 
and must be dealt with in two ways: assessment of impacts and vulnerability, as well as 
the development and implementation of strategies and concrete measures in risk 
management. However, the way to solve the challenge has some problems Bernauer 
(2013): 
• The reduction of GHG emission is a measure for medium to long term and people 
tend to ignore damages which will occur in the long term and, also, the benefits 
of mitigation; 
• As it should be a long-term policy, the uncertainties in the government, whose 
preferences can change over time, can be seen as an obstacle to start such policies 
– “The political uncertainty problem described here is somewhat similar to the 
time-inconsistency problem in economic theory”; and 
• Cost–benefit distributions within countries must be attractive but, in the climate 
case, few industries will benefit with this, but the costs are likely to be very high 
to average companies and consumers, which means “neither industry nor 
consumers are likely to support strong climate policies”. 
Solomon and Krishna (2011) emphasized the importance on focusing in the power sector 
as it has “the potential to save much more energy and reduce more GHG emissions than 
with end use technologies in buildings and vehicles, since large quantities of waste heat 
can be recovered in a cost-effective and non-polluting manner”. 
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So, when focusing on the power sector, in the view of Bicalho and Queiroz (2012), to talk 
about energy policies in the world it is necessary to talk about the trade-off equation 
between energy security3 and climate change. 
Achieving a truly sustainable energy transition requires progress across multiple 
dimensions beyond climate change mitigation goals (von Stechow et al. 2015). 
Energy security has different meanings for each country accord to its position in the world 
market; for example, energy security for an exporting country like Russia is different 
from what would be for emerging countries like China and India. 
For other countries, such as Japan, energy security refers to the need to compensate for 
its drastic shortage of energy resources through diversification, trade and investment 
(Bicalho and Queiroz 2012).  Furthermore, in Europe, the problem of energy security 
revolves around dependence on natural gas imported from Russia; and in the United 
States, discussing energy security involves addressing the problem of its supply from a 
perspective that is not restricted to the use of its own resources but incorporates global 
resources (Bicalho and Queiroz 2012). 
According to Bicalho and Queiroz (2012) Brazilian energy security will not depend on 
global energy markets, either on the import side or on the export side. The role of Brazil 
in the energy context brings together elements present in the Russian, Indian and Chinese 
cases. Like Russia, Brazil presents a base of energy resources that makes the country a 
candidate for a position of net exporter of energy. On the other hand, like China and India, 
Brazil is a significant emerging energy market. However, unlike Russia, a significant part 
of Brazilian energy production must remain in the country itself, and unlike China and 
India, Brazil has achieved self-sufficiency (Bicalho and Queiroz 2012). 
Mitigation actions aim at decreasing the level of climate change by reducing GHG 
emissions or the presence of these gasses in the atmosphere, which reduce the need for 
new adaptation actions. 
In order to sustain international climate negotiations, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established in the 1992 Rio Convention, 
                                                          
3 Energy security here means have access to the energy needed in enough amounts and with a reasonable 
price and avoiding partial or total, temporary or permanent interruption of the service. 
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to structure the intergovernmental process of negotiation between countries, with the goal 
of limiting anthropogenic effect on climate. More than 1904 States have already signed 
the Convention and committed to stabilizing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system (Bicalho and Queiroz 2012). 
Among the advances in this intergovernmental process can be highlighted (Bicalho and 
Queiroz 2012): 
• The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997 at COP (Conference of the Parties) 3, which 
set concrete targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and mechanisms for 
nations to achieve this goal; 
• GHG emission limit of 5.2% was established in relation to 1990; 
• The principle of differentiated responsibility, which recognizes developed 
countries as being primarily responsible for the current high levels of GHG 
emissions into the atmosphere, which has been the result of more than 150 years 
of industrial activity; 
• During the COP 15 the long-term goal of limiting the maximum increase in global 
average temperature to no more than 2 degrees Celsius over pre-industrial levels 
was subject to a revision in 2015 but, there was no agreement on how to do this 
in practical terms; 
• The COP 16 in Cancun strengthened international recognition on the need to limit 
global warming to 2 degrees Celsius and to achieve this it was necessary to take 
practical and concrete measures to reduce GHG emissions and to take advantage 
of adequate funds for these actions; 
• COP 21 in Paris, in 2015, one of the goals is to keep global warming below 2 ° C, 
further seeking to raise the temperature to 1.5 ° C above pre-industrial levels and 
that developed countries should invest $100 billion for measures to combat 
climate change and adaptation in developing countries. 
These facts lead to conclude that the world knows the danger of not limiting the climate 
change effects, particularly the temperature rise. However, no one know for sure how to 
achieve it effectively considering all the limitations, economic, political, ... 
                                                          
4 Recently U.S. decided to leave the agreement. 
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Furthermore, Bicalho and Queiroz (2012) explains the climate change and energy security 
interconnection, which makes difficult to establish policies to reduce climate change. The 
striking presence of fossil fuels in both climate change and energy security is at the root 
of the current convergence between environmental and energy issues. For the first one, 
fossil fuels are the main cause of climate change. For the second one, fossil fuels play a 
key role in ensuring the energy supply needed for economic development and social 
welfare, thanks to a set of attributes (storage, density, availability and control) presented 
by these fuels which allow their use at extremely favorable levels of scale and cost. This 
antagonism is what creates the conflict between climate and energy goals. 
Thus, energy security and climate change are two themes that are correlated through fossil 
fuels. To reduce climate change it is necessary to reduce emissions, which means reducing 
the use of fossil fuels and/or reducing the energy consumption. 
Moreover, according to Edenhofer et al. (2013), climate change mitigation is not the only 
critical argument in favor of renewable energy development policies, there is also (known 
as co-benefits):  
• Greater energy security; 
• Green jobs; 
• Green growth; 
• Reduced local environmental damage;  
• Reduced poverty; 
• Among others.  
So, there are two ways to do the transition and they are presented by Bicalho (2013) as 
being: 
• Transition maintaining the resource base: carbon capture and storage technology 
and continue to use coal. 
• Transition changing the resource base: the challenge is to provide renewable fuels 
with the same attributes5 as fossils. Therefore, renewables can come in without 
making a big impact on the energy system. 
                                                          
5 The attributes are pointed out as being high availability and high stockpile, large stocks and great control 
over these fuels means that it is possible to have this energy when it is wanted, where it is wanted and 
when it is wanted. This is the great quality of fossil fuels, it's the advantage they give to the system. 
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Now, having this in mind, some mitigation and adaptation researches have been 
conducted in many countries. One of them was led by Shafiei et al. (2015), in which they 
studied how adaption to climate change would influence the entire energy system in 
Iceland, from 2015-2050, and to what extent it would change the overall costs and 
development potential with the intention of quantifying the economic value of adapting 
the energy supply sector to climate change. They identify the corresponding development 
paths and implementation of supply technologies in long-term with focus on the biomass 
and hydro energy resources, as they assumed the impact of climate change on geothermal, 
wind and municipal/industrial wastes would be insignificant. 
As a result Shafiei et al. (2015) concluded that: total installed capacity of future hydro 
plants would be 6% higher by 2050 (i.e. 880 GWh/year) if adaptation is implemented in 
the hydro sector; the cost of new hydro resources is reduced by increasing the hydro run-
off (glacial and non-glacial) - around 7% by 2050; reduction in the generation cost and 
the market price of electricity and biofuels. Thus, the energy supply sector in Iceland 
could be an example of a mitigation-adaptation win-win case. 
Lucena et al. (2010) applied an integrated resource planning approach to calculate least-
cost adaptation measures to a set of projected climate impacts on the Brazilian power 
sector, using the A2 and B2 scenarios.  Their results pointed in the direction of an 
increased installed capacity based, mostly, on natural gas, but also sugarcane bagasse, 
wind power and coal/nuclear plants, to compensate for a lower reliability of hydroelectric 
production, amongst other impacts. 
Giannakopoulos, Psiloglou, and Lemesios (2016) conducted a research to investigate the 
climate change impacts, vulnerability and adaptive capacity of the electrical energy sector 
in Cyprus until 2050. They found out a decrease trend in electrical energy consumption 
due to warmer conditions between November and April and an increasing trend in 
electricity consumption is evident as warmer conditions due to warmer periods in summer 
between May and October. 
Borba et al. (2012) estimated the potential for energy-related GHG emission reductions 
in Brazil and their abatement costs; as a result they found a potential to reduce future 
energy-related GHG emissions by 27% in 2030. However, in spite of that, the mitigation 
                                                          
However, when considering the renewable, the energy is available when it rains, when it is windy and 
when it is sunny, which means, low availability, low control and low energy liquidity (Bicalho 2013). 
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potential identified in the country was not large enough, in absolute terms, to reduce 
energy-related GHG emissions below the current level in Brazil by 2030 (which 
contradicts Solomon and Krishna (2011) who identified the energy sector as having a 
great potential to save energy and reduce GHG. 
Another research was conducted by Solomon and Krishna (2011) who studied the 
Brazilian transition from petroleum based fuel to ethanol. “When the OPEC 
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil shock occurred, Brazil was 
importing 80% of its petroleum” and “today, Brazil is the world’s largest exporter of 
ethanol”. They explained that the success of the program was due to three main factors: 
“multiple government objectives were met by supporting a major ethanol program; 
widespread stakeholder support coalesced for the program (despite initial opposition from 
Petrobras and carmakers); and the government’s emphasis on technology innovation” 
(Lehtonen, 2007; Gee and McMeekin, 2011 apud Solomon and Krishna 2011). 
Solomon and Krishna (2011) also provided a list of general lessons, after studying a 
Brazilian (success - shifted from an oil-based transportation system to one based on 
sugarcane- ethanol), French (success - shifted from oil-fired electric power to nuclear 
power) and U.S. (failure - attempted to shift from foreign oil to a mix of domestic energy 
resources) transitions, which can be summarizes as: 
• a stated ambition for an energy transition is not enough;  
• energy alternatives have to be nurtured through a combination of research and 
technology development and deployment policies over a sustained period; 
• nationalistic sentiments and centralized power appear to be important for 
marshalling resources in a sustained way;  
• existence of new types of energy companies and jobs can help governments to 
stay committed and focused; and  
• relative costs of new energy technologies also must develop favorably.   
Therefore, mitigation and adaptation strategies can be used independently to solve the 
problem, though the importance of using both together is because they are complementary 
in solving the problem. “Even if emissions are stopped immediately, temperatures will 
remain elevated for centuries due to the effect of greenhouse gases from past human 
emissions already present in the atmosphere. Limiting temperature rise will require 
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substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions” but it will not stop 
climate change but minimize its effects and reduce the longevity of the phenomenon (ECF 
et al. 2014). 
Thus, to reduce emissions to levels commensurate with the internationally agreed goal of 
keeping the temperature increase since pre-industrial times below 2°C, the share of low-
carbon electricity generation by 2050 will need to triple or quadruple. Use of fossil fuels 
without carbon capture would virtually disappear by 2100 at the latest. The energy sector 
would be completely decarbonized, and it is likely that technologies able to withdraw 
CO2 from the atmosphere would need to be deployed (ECF et al. 2014). 
Moreover, the investment in low carbon technologies are pointed by the ECF et al. as one 
alternative to the climate problem. The foundation suggests that 
“replacing existing coal-fired heat and/or power plants by highly efficient 
natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) power plants or combined heat and power 
(CHP) plants can reduce near-term emissions (provided that fugitive methane 
release is controlled) and be a ‘bridging technology’ to a low-carbon economy. 
Increased use of CHP plants can reduce emissions. CCS, nuclear power and 
renewables provide low-carbon electricity, while increasing energy efficiency 
and reducing final energy demand will reduce the amount of supply-side 
mitigation needed. In 2012, more than half of the net investment in the 
electricity sector was in low-carbon technologies” (ECF et al. 2014). 
However, supply-side investments required to meet the 2°C target are estimated at USD 
190–900 billion per year on average up to 2050. Much of this investment would yield co-
benefits such as reduced air and water pollution, which would include human health and 
well-being, and increased local employment. But supply side mitigation typically also 
carries risks (ECF et al. 2014). 
Based on that, many mitigation strategies were identified for developing nations and they 
are classified, according to Sathaye and Ravindranath (1998), into two categories: energy 
efficiency, which reduces the use of energy without compromising the level of service; 
and switching to less–carbon intensive fuels, which is reducing GHG emission without 
reducing energy generation. 
Thus, to avoid or minimize the effects of climatic changes, some mitigation and 
adaptation policies have been suggested by some studies by institutions related with 
climate change and some researchers in the area  (Pereira et al. 2010 apud PBMC 2014b; 
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Lucena, Schaeffer, and Szklo 2012a; Lucena et al. 2009; Sathaye and Ravindranath 
1998): 
• Demand side: 
o Definition of electricity prices to reflect the actual propensity of customer 
payment, which would increase the price paid by customers with higher 
income as the waste of electricity tends to be higher among these users; 
o Granting low-interest loans for conservation programs and replacing 
equipment by government financial institutions; 
o A discount to customers who switch to more efficient equipment can be an 
interesting option for utilities when the cost of supply expansion threshold 
exceeds the cost of discount program; 
o Creating Energy Conservation Companies, which can conduct audits, 
installing new equipment and implement conservation programs in 
companies. They can also benefit from energy efficiency auction; 
o The creation of energy efficiency standards even more severe and applied 
more broadly to a wider range of electrical appliances equipment; 
o Incentives for substitution of electric showers by gas heaters (more 
economically viable alternative), or even solar panels; 
o In the case of air conditioning and food preservation, it would be interesting 
to encourage broader replacing inefficient equipment with more efficient 
models; 
o Use of more efficient lighting, such as high-pressure sodium lamp, mercury 
vapor or the more modern and more efficient LED; 
o In office buildings and shopping malls, thermal storage systems can be an 
economically interesting alternative to reduce electricity consumption at 
times when the rate is higher; 
o The direct implementation of solar panels in low-income communities by 
their own dealers may be advantageous for companies: as low-income 
consumers pay lower tariffs, would be more profitable for the dealership 
selling the energy saved to consumers who pay more. In addition, by 
reducing electricity bills of low-income consumers, utilities would face less 
default; and may be easier / cheaper decrease the demand for these 
communities to reduce the theft of electricity (this measure got attention 
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after being implemented, during the 1980’s, by a Californian company 
which changed, for free, normal lamps for more efficient ones in 
municipalities that were classified as bad payers; doing this the company 
saved energy and concluded that was more interesting to invest in this 
measure than to invest to attend more consumers); 
o Architectural designs that make better use of natural lighting and ventilation. 
o Improving the energy performance of equipment such as cook stoves, 
lamps, electric motors, appliances, boilers, buildings, vehicles; 
o Improving the energy performance of processes, particularly in the energy-
intensive industries of aluminum, cement, chemicals, fertilizers, iron and 
steel, and paper; 
• Supply side: 
o The easiest way to increase the surplus energy of the ethanol and sugar mills 
is to improve the backpressure steam turbine Rankine cycle boiler raising 
the pressure to 82 bar. An intermediate alternative is the use of Steam 
Turbine extraction / condensation; 
o Possible need for utilities to buy excess energy from sugar mills, avoiding 
the costs of generation, transmission and distribution with long-term 
contracts; 
o Incentives for interconnection of power plants to the grid without undue 
delay or technical requirements without reasonableness; 
o Incentives for research and development of revolutionary technologies such 
as the gasification of bagasse and combined cycle power generation in sugar 
mills; 
o Reduction by the government, of the information barriers in the latest 
technologies (such as the development of demonstration projects) as well as 
offer long-term loans with attractive interest rates for sugar mills to adopt 
more efficient technologies; 
o The expansion of wind power generation (however, wind power energy, in 
some situation may not be economically competitive); 
o The controlled incineration of waste and the further use of the exhaust gas 
to produce electricity; 
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o The recovery of biogas (landfill gas) generated by the natural decomposition 
of organic waste. In addition to the biogas solid waste, can also be used the 
gas produced by wastewater treatment; 
o Improving equipment for power generation; 
o Improving transmission and distribution, by reducing the flaring of natural 
gas, by plugging of pipeline leaks;  
o Improving coal distribution; 
o Rehabilitation and efficiency improvements for power plants; 
o Rehabilitation and upgrading transmission and distribution systems; 
o Reducing transmission losses; 
o Creating bagasse/ biomass cogeneration/ bioenergy systems; 
o Using small hydropower, wind, off-grid solar photovoltaics, fuel cells, solar 
thermal power generation, and other renewable energy sources. 
Many suggestions are mentioned in the literature, although some of them has the potential 
to reduce GHG and energy consumption more than others. 
Additionally, the use of biomass was pointed as an important mitigation option but, its 
use must be carefully evaluated because of potentially negative consequences that may 
undermine the original objective like land use changes, deforestation, conflicts between 
land and water for food production and biofuel productions, etc. (Edenhofer et al. 2013). 
Furthermore, a study entitled Energy [R]evolution, claim that the national energy mix 
could become close to 93% renewable by 2050. The actions would be focused on the 
elimination of diesel, oil, coal and nuclear power stations and gradual decrease in the 
share of running on natural gas in extent that would increase the share of renewable 
sources (PBMC 2014b; Teske et al. 2015). 
However, “even though the emissions landscape is changing rapidly, fossil fuels still 
provide 81.2% of the world’s primary energy supply. In 2014, for the first time in 40 
years, global energy-related CO2 emissions remained stable in spite of continued 
economic growth, thanks mainly to declining coal consumption in China” (Teske et al. 
2015). 
The idea of a clean / green energy system, to avoid climate issues, is already out there and 
there are, by now, some studies analyzing strategies to make it happen. As this research 
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aims to analyze the potential of smart grid technology to mitigate and adapt the power 
sector, the next topic will address SG technology. 
Smart grids 
A smart grid is, according to IEA (2011)  
an electricity network that uses digital and other advanced technologies to 
monitor and manage the transport of electricity from all generation sources to 
meet the varying electricity demands of end-users. Smart grids co-ordinate the 
needs and capabilities of all generators, grid operators, end-users and 
electricity market stakeholders to operate all parts of the system as efficiently 
as possible, minimizing costs and environmental impacts while maximizing 
system reliability, resilience and stability.  
Smart grid is a much-commented topic by energy sectors, governments and research 
institutes, although the integration of automatisms (and other “intelligent” devices) has 
been always a concern of power engineers. 
“There is no clear line between smart and “traditional” power systems, neither 
in functionality nor in time. The electrical energy system has always contained 
components that added a bit of “smartness”: protection relays that interrupt 
power flow, energy meters, remotely operated substations, and cascades of 
power stations that implement ancillary services. Thus, the upcoming smart 
grid is not really the first attempt to make the power system smart” (Palensky 
and Kupzog 2013, 203). 
Though, Palensky and Kupzog (2013, 202), when writing a review on smart grid 
evolution, started with the following famous comparison: “although Alexander Graham 
Bell would not recognize today’s telecommunication system, Thomas Edison would be 
very familiar with today’s energy grid”, clamming that is more than time to improve and 
evolve the electric system.  
In order to do that came the concept of smart grid and developing a smart grid would 
allow us to: 
• flexibly manage capacities for growing demand; 
• accommodate new sources of energy with bidirectional and flexible grids; 
• allow new players to participate in new energy markets.  
In this way, “the new technology is seen as an additional instrument available to States to 
achieve targets for promoting competition, increasing the safety of electricity systems and 
combating climate change” (Clastres 2011). 
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Furthermore, the smart grid is also pointed as one key concept for reaching the climate 
goals.  
As the goals heavily rely on increasing the share of renewable energy sources and, it is 
especially the renewable and distributed types of energy sources (wind, solar, small 
hydro) that require such flexibility (Palensky and Kupzog 2013, 202), smart grids may 
reduce or even solve the problem between climate change and energy security previously 
addressed by Bicalho and Queiroz (2012). 
As could be predicted, there is no one simple characteristic that differ a smart grid from 
a non-smart / traditional grid. “First, it is about functionality. A smart grid can host the 
latest energy products and technologies. This flexibility is based on two design principles: 
more distributed architecture, i.e., more physical players in the system, flexibly 
networked by more information and communication technology (ICT), which implements 
adaptive controls and other smart algorithms.” (Palensky and Kupzog 2013, 202). 
However, Palensky and Kupzog enphasize that  
“it is important to understand that we need an entirely smart energy system, 
not just a smart grid. The grid, i.e., transport and distribution infrastructure, is 
certainly important and requires dramatic upgrades but so do the end points of 
the energy system: generation, storage, and demand. Technological upgrades 
like more efficient or low-emission technologies must be combined with 
systematic upgrades, for instance, coordinated demand and supply, automatic 
analytics, and other ICT-based functions. Demand response (DR) is an 
example of smart coordination of energy resources” (Palensky and Kupzog 
2013, 203). 
The US Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 apud Palensky and Kupzog 
(2013) explicitly lists the smart grid properties as follows: 
(1) Increased use of digital information and controls technology to improve 
reliability, security, and efficiency of the electric grid; 
(2) Dynamic optimization of grid operations and resources, with full cyber-security. 
(3) Deployment and integration of distributed resources and generation, including 
renewable resources; 
(4) Development and incorporation of DR, demand-side resources, and energy-
efficiency resources; 
(5) Deployment of smart technologies (real time, automated, interactive technologies 
that optimize the physical operation of appliances and consumer devices) for 
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metering, communications concerning grid operations and status, and distribution 
automation; 
(6) Integration of “smart” appliances and consumer devices; 
(7) Deployment and integration of advanced electricity storage and peak-shaving 
technologies, including plug-in electric and hybrid electric vehicles, and thermal-
storage air conditioning; 
(8) Provision to consumers of timely information and control options; 
(9) Development of standards for communication and interoperability of appliances 
and equipment connected to the electric grid, including the infrastructure serving 
the grid; 
(10) Identification and lowering of unreasonable or unnecessary barriers. 
There are also some assumptions, pointed by the working group on smart grids (2010), 
about smart grids benefits as: 
• Reduction of peak: the studies about this subject are not similar. For the European 
Regulators' Group for Electricity and Gas (2007, apud Working Group on Smart 
Grids, 2010) this reduction is because of better information in the bill; and for 
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (2006, apud Working Group on Smart 
Grids, 2010) the reduction in based on the consumer’s potential to save energy 
with hourly rate; 
• Reduction of non-technical losses: when compared to electromechanical meter, 
electronic ones facilitate the detection of fraud, either through alarms or through 
indicators; 
• Reduction of losses: the reduction of the maximum demand of low voltage circuits 
and total consumption results in a decrease in technical losses because the load of 
networks and transformer is alleviated; 
• Reduction in the total consumption: changing the consumption habits and 
reducing the non-technical losses. 
Moreover, considering the infiltration of smart grids in power systems, a U.S. Department 
of Energy’s report (apud Hamilton and Summy 2011) suggests that “100% penetration 
of smart grid technology in the U.S. could lead to an 18% reduction in carbon dioxide 
emissions by 2030”. And “if the electrical grid were simply 5% more efficient, the 
efficiency gain could displace the equivalent of 42 coal-fired power plants, and that would 
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equate to permanently eliminating the fuel and greenhouse gas emissions of 53 million 
cars” (Hamilton and Summy 2011). 
Smart grids are also expected to allow reducing the CO2 emission. In the Smart Grids 
Roadmap by IEA (International Energy Agency) (2011), the best scenario “estimates that 
smart grids offer the potential to achieve net annual emissions reductions of 0.7 Gt to 2.1 
Gt of CO2 by 2050” (IEA 2011, 29). According to this report, these reductions would 
occur through: 
• Feedback on energy usage; 
• Lower line losses; 
• Accelerated deployment of energy efficiency programs; 
• Continuous commissioning of service sector load; 
• Energy savings due to peak load management; 
• Smart grid support for the wider introduction of electric vehicles;  
• Deeper integration of intermittent renewable generation. 
Furthermore, to get these emissions reductions values, IEA (2011) analyzed four regions, 
OECD North America, OECD Europe, OECD Pacific and China, and the data used during 
the analysis was: 
• Annual demand; 
• Electric vehicle deployment and peak demand as a function of electric vehicle 
deployment; 
• Demand response potential; 
• Future potential electricity uses in buildings; 
• Deployment of advanced metering infrastructure. 
Smart grid is a concept that is already being implemented in some countries or in a few 
specific regions of other ones. 
Table 3 presents technologies covered by smart grids and reach all the areas of the power 
sector. 
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Table 3: Smart grid technology areas 
Technologies Electricity System 
Wide-area monitoring and control Generation, Transmission 
Information and communication technology 
integration 
Generation, Transmission, Distribution, 
Industrial, Service, Residential 
Renewable and distributed generation integration 
Generation, Transmission, Distribution, 
Industrial, Service, Residential 
Transmission enhancement applications Transmission 
Distribution grid management Distribution 
Advanced metering infrastructure Distribution, Industrial, Service, Residential 
Electric vehicle charging infrastructure Distribution, Industrial, Service, Residential 
Customer-side system Industrial, Service, Residential 
Source: IEA (2011) 
Smart grid is shown as a global trend and, according to Palensky and Kupzog (2013),  
Management and Strategic Studies Center (2012) and Clastres (2011), each country has 
its particular purpose to implement a smart grid,  which can be presented as: 
• Europe: motivated by clean energy, reduce GHG emissions, distributed 
generation and energy efficiency; 
o Denmark and Sweden: possible contribution to widespread use of plug-in 
electric vehicles;  
o Spain: wants to improve the quality of supply with fewer incidents; 
o Portugal: intends to improve integration of renewables in its electricity 
system;  
o Italy: reduce fraud;  
o Netherlands: expects to save energy while cutting greenhouse gas 
emissions; 
o United Kingdom: possibility to boost the availability of dual-energy 
solutions, leading to economies of scale on the production and installation 
of meters;  
o France: to inform consumers, control demand for energy, increase the 
quality of supply, optimize the operation of the energy market, and to limit 
costs of distribution network operation. 
• United States: motivated by network effectiveness and losses; and  
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• Pacific Asia: motivated by font substitution, demand growth and technological 
market; 
Some researches had been published around smart grid’s implementation and its benefits. 
Xenias et al. (2015) applied a two round Policy Delphi process with a range of sectoral 
experts who discussed important drivers, barriers, benefits, risks and expected functions 
of smarter grids, to inform the development of smarter grids. Their analyses indicated 
broad consensus of the necessity for smarter grids, particularly for economic and 
environmental reasons; yet stakeholders also associated a range of risks and barriers: lack 
of investment; disengaged consumers; complexity; and data privacy with measures to 
make the grid smarter. 
IEA (2010b,p.154 apud Clastres 2011) found out that, compared to the baseline scenario 
in 2050, smart grids offer the potential to: 
• Achieve savings of between 0.9 GtCO2 and 2.2 GtCO2 a year; 
o Direct reductions: from 0.2 to 0.85 GtCO2 a year under the Blue Map6 
scenario compared with the baseline scenario; 
o Indirect cuts: from 0.65 to 1.31 GtCO2 a year. 
According to the IEA (2011) “peak demand will increase between 2010 and 2050 in all 
regions” and “smart grids deployment could reduce the projected peak demand growth 
by 13% to 24%”. Moreover, according to Faruqui et al. (2007 apud Clastres 2011), 
automated management can reduce peak demand by 20 to 50%, and overall demand by 
10 to 15%, but, “the danger with automated management is that peak consumption may 
simply shift, reappearing when all the loads reconnect at the same time”. However, this 
possibility is quite reduced under a smart grid environment. 
It is important to reduce the peak load as electricity system infrastructure is designed to 
meet the highest level of demand. So, during non-peak times the system is typically 
underutilized. Building the system to satisfy occasional peak demand requires 
                                                          
6 “The BLUE Map scenario is target-oriented: it sets the goal of halving global energy-related CO2 
emissions by 2050 (compared to 2005 levels) and examines the least-cost means of achieving that goal 
through the deployment of existing and new low-carbon technologies. The BLUE scenarios also enhance 
energy security (e.g. by reducing dependence on fossil fuels) and bring other benefits that contribute to 
economic development (e.g. improved health due to lower air pollution)”(IEA 2010). 
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investments in capacity that would not be needed if the demand curve were flatter (IEA 
2011). 
Smart grid implementation is expected to increase competitiveness as it is expected to be 
able to add in U.S. (Hamilton and Summy 2011): 
• each US$1 billion invested in smart grid technology is projected to propel US$100 
billion in gross domestic product growth;  
• greater consumer control over power consumption could add US$5–7 billion 
annually to the United States by 2015 and US$15–20 billion per year by 2020;  
• distributed generation technologies and smart, interactive storage for residential 
and small commercial applications could potentially add another US$10 billion 
per year if 10% penetration is achieved by 2020; 
• the value creation associated with the smart grid’s “green” capabilities can 
outpace more traditional energy investments. For example, clean-energy 
investments are estimated to result in 16,7 jobs for every US$1 million in 
spending, while spending on fossil fuels is estimated to generate 5,3 jobs per US$1 
million in spending. 
Finally, Table 4 presents some online informative portals about smart grid in some 
countries and/or regions over the world. 
Table 4: Platforms about smart grids projects over the world 
Region Country Link 
North America United States http://www.smartgrid.gov/ 
North America United States http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/ 
North America United States http://energy.gov/science-innovation/electric-power/smart-grid 
North America Mexico http://vmwl1.iie.org.mx/sitioIIE/sitio/indice.php 
North America Mexico http://www.cre.gob.mx/inicio.aspx 
North America Canada http://sgcanada.org/ 
South America Colombia http://www.colombiainteligente.com.co/Pages/default.aspx 
Africa South Africa http://www.sasgi.org.za/ 
Asia South Korea http://www.smartgrid.or.kr/eng.htm 
Asia Japan http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1208/1208.5394.pdf 
Europe  http://ses.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
Europe Portugal http://www.inovgrid.pt/pt 
47 
 
Europe Portugal http://www.inovcity.pt/ 
Europe  http://ses.jrc.ec.europa.eu/project-maps 
Europe  http://www.smartgrids.eu/links 
Oceania Australia http://www.ausgrid.com.au/ 
Source: Redes Inteligented Brasil, 2015  
The present section presented an overview about smart grids in the world, showing that 
each country has its own purposes to implement them and remarking that these reasons 
will influence the kind of technologies that will be applied. This section ends with an 
identification of the main expected advantages of the smart grids implementations in 
different countries. The Chapter III contemplates the methodological proposal for this 
research. 
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents a methodological proposal to estimate the impact caused by the 
implementation of SG as a mitigation and adaptation strategy, considering the effects of 
climate change in the power energy sector. 
To answer the research question, the characterization of the methodological approach is 
presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: Methodological approaches 
Point of view Methodology Justification 
Nature Applied 
Find a solution for an immediate problem facing an economic 
sector and, consequently society. 
Approach  Quantitative Quantitative measures of the phenomenon characteristics. 
Goals 
Exploratory 
Initial approach in order to become more familiar with the 
problem. 
Descriptive Enable the creation of scenarios. 
Technical procedures 
Bibliographic 
research 
State of the art of the subject 
Case study Analyse various aspects of the power industry 
Simulation 
Construction of potential scenarios to observe the dynamic 
behaviour of a sub system when imposing/changing some 
conditions. 
Adapted from: Gil (2008) and Marconi and Lakatos (2010) 
For the development of scenarios and analysis it was used secondary data, especially from 
(Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico 2015; IBGE n.d.; IPCC n.d.; SEEG n.d.; 
EPE/MME 2016; EPE - Empresa de Pesquisa Energética 2007; EPE/MME 2015b; 
Ministério de Minas e Energia 2015b). 
The projection of global climate change impacts is not in the scope of this thesis – the 
climate change scenarios adopted in this work are borrowed from the climate experts 
(IPCC 2013). The present research is focused on analyzing mitigation and adaptation 
opportunities to the climatic change impacts on the Brazilian energy sector, and it is based 
on the studies presented along the literature review. Figure 2 presents a small diagram 
with the main steps used in this methodology. 
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Figure 2: Diagram of methodological approach to analyze the impact of climate change in the power 
sector and the use of SG as an adaptation and mitigation strategy 
The next topic will address in detail each step of the diagram presented in Figure 2. 
Methodology to create the scenarios 
As this thesis aims to analyze the impact of smart grids in the future Brazilian power grid 
and discuss its potential to mitigate and adapt the grid to climate change impacts, it is 
necessary to obtain projections for the future climate, electricity sector and smart grids 
penetration. 
Thus, two alternatives can be considered: (1) construction of new scenarios based on 
specific indicators present in the literature or; (2) taking on pre-existent scenarios or 
adaptation of pre-existent scenarios, which were used in previous researches in the area. 
As referred before, it was decided to use pre-existing scenarios built by IPCC – SRES 
family scenarios related with global and regional climate change impacts –, EPE – 
Brazilian energy sector scenarios for 2030 – and Duarte et.al – Smart Grids penetration 
and benefits scenarios. Table 5 presents all the different scenarios that will be addressed 
in the next sub-topics, the pre-existing scenarios for climate change, electric sector and 
smart grids implementation in Brazil. Each one of the scenarios presented above was 
created using a specific storyline, which is summarized in Table 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
CC projections and 
downscaling 
Generation Impacts Consumption Impacts 
Calculate the impact of SG 
(adaptation; mitigation) 
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Table 6: Scenarios summary 
Source Global Scenarios Local Scenarios  
IPCC 
A1F1 A1F1 
A1 Family A1T A1T 
A1B A1B 
A2 A2 A2 Family 
B1 B1 B1 Family 
B2 B2 B2 Family 
EPE 
Uno World (Mundo Uno) A – In the top of the wave (Na crista da onda)  
Archipelago (Arquipélago) 
B1 - Surfing small waves (Surfando a marola)  
B2 - Paddle boat (Pedalinho)  
Island (Ilha) C – Castaway (Náufrago)  
Duarte et.al 
 Conservative  
 Moderate  
 Fast  
Climate Change Scenarios  
The SRES scenarios (Special Report on Emissions Scenarios) from IPCC are a group of 
scenarios created to predict the expected impacts on future climate (IPCC WG III 2000). 
According to this report, there are four family of scenarios, which are the combination 
between “A” and “B” with “1” and “2”. The A and B are related with economic and social 
development and growth being:  the "A" families, related with unsustainable and unequal 
economic growth and the "B" families, relate with the sustainable development and 
human equity.  
In the same way, the 1 and 2 are related to problem solving and integration of the world, 
being:  "1" families, the scenarios that use global cooperation to solve problems and the 
"2" families, the ones that address/solve problems in a local or regional way. 
Figure 3 represents this arrangement. 
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Figure 3: Organization of the family scenarios in terms of problem solving approach 
Source: IPCC 
Moreover, the storylines for each scenario family is described below. 
A1 storyline and scenario family:  
• very rapid economic growth 
• global population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter 
• rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies 
• major underlying themes are convergence among regions, capacity building, and 
increased cultural and social interactions 
• substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income 
• A1 scenario family develops into three groups that describe alternative directions 
of technological change in the energy system 
o A1FI: fossil intensive 
o A1T: non-fossil energy sources 
o A1B: balance across all sources (Balanced is defined as not relying too 
heavily on one particular energy source, on the assumption that similar 
improvement rates apply to all energy supply and end use 
technologies). 
A2 storyline and scenario family: 
• very heterogeneous world 
• self-reliance and preservation of local identities 
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• fertility patterns across regions converge very slowly 
• continuously increasing global population 
• economic development is primarily regionally oriented 
• per capita economic growth and technological change are more fragmented and 
slower than in other storylines. 
The B1 storyline and scenario family: 
• convergent world 
• global population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter 
• rapid changes in economic structures toward a service and information economy 
• reductions in material intensity 
• introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies 
• emphasis in global solutions to economic, social, and environmental 
sustainability, including improved equity, but without additional climate 
initiatives. 
The B2 storyline and scenario family: 
• emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social, and environmental 
sustainability 
• continuously increasing global population at a rate lower than A2  
• intermediate levels of economic development 
• less rapid and more diverse technological change than in the B1 and A1 
storylines 
• oriented toward environmental protection and social equity 
• focuses on local and regional levels. 
The main features of each scenario can be seen in Table 7. 
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Table 7: SRES driving forces tendencies 
 A1F1 A1B A1T A2 B1 B2 
Population growth Low low low High Low Medium 
Economic growth very high very high 
very 
high 
Medium High Medium 
Energy use very high very high high High High Medium 
Pace of changes in 
technology 
Rapid rapid rapid Slow Medium Medium 
Technological 
changes favoring 
coal, oil 
and gas 
balance 
of energy 
options 
non-
fossil 
fuel 
varied by 
region 
clean and 
resource 
efficient 
varied by 
region 
Environmental 
awareness 
Low low low 
varied by 
region 
High High 
Focus on social 
equality 
Low low low 
varied by 
region 
High High 
Scale Global global global local/regional Global local/regional 
Source: IPCC 
Table 7 presented the tendencies for eight driving forces related with climate change. 
Lastly, as presented in the literature review and noticed in many studies conducted in the 
last years, when leading a research on climate change in a country or region, the most 
used scenarios are the A2 and B2 IPCC family scenarios.  Although climate change being 
a world problem, the policies and the solution will be regional as the resources, access to 
technology, environmental characteristics, and many other necessary issues that are 
different from place to place. 
Electric Sector Scenarios  
Another scenario group are the scenarios for the electric sector, which were created by 
EPE (Energy Research Agency) in order to develop an expansion plan to the energy 
sector. The four national scenarios were based in three global scenarios, described below 
in terms of three critical uncertainties (EPE, 2007) – note that the global scenarios are 
similar to the SRES scenarios in what concerns problem solve and integration of the 
world. 
• Uno World: 
o Standard globalization: 
▪ maximum connectivity – multilateralism 
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o Power structure political and economic:  
▪ balance and sharing of political power 
▪ coordinate macroeconomic policies 
o Conflict resolution: 
▪ negotiated solutions 
• Archipelago: 
o Standard globalization: 
▪ partial Connectivity – economic blocs 
o Power structure political and economic:  
▪ hegemony of the blocks led by the United States and European 
Union 
▪ recovery of macroeconomic balance in the US economy through 
internal adjustment 
o Conflict resolution:  
▪ localized conflicts 
• Island: 
o Standard globalization: 
▪ interrupted connectivity – protectionism  
o Power structure political and economic:  
▪ greater participation of blocks from Asian countries 
▪ rupture of China–United States trade relations, followed by slow 
economic recovery 
o Conflict resolution:  
▪ sharp differences 
These three global uncertainty states were used to create four national scenarios, which 
will be used during the next steps of this thesis. They can be described as: 
• A – In the top of the wave 
o Infrastructure: 
▪ significant reduction of bottlenecks 
o Inequalities of income:  
▪ significant reduction 
o Competitiveness of production factors:  
▪ high earnings and widespread 
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o Total economy productivity 
▪ high 
• B1 – Surfing small waves 
o Infrastructure: 
▪ partially offset bottlenecks 
o Inequalities of income:  
▪ reduction relevant 
o Competitiveness of production factors:  
▪ important gains but selective 
o Total economy productivity 
▪ medium to high 
• B2 – Paddle boat 
o Infrastructure: 
▪ remain major bottlenecks 
o Inequalities of income:  
▪ small reduction 
o Competitiveness of production factors:  
▪ little gains significant and concentrated in some sectors 
o Total economy productivity 
▪ medium for reduced 
• C – Castaway 
o Infrastructure: 
▪ relevant deficiency 
o Inequalities of income:  
▪ maintenance 
o Competitiveness of production factors:  
▪ low, although with gains concentrated in some sectors 
o Total economy productivity 
▪ Reduced 
As, used before by Borba et al. (2012), the scenario B1 from PNE 2030 will be used as a 
baseline/reference scenario as it is the one that better represents the observed evolution. 
Table 8 presents the evolution of some economic variables in the projections available in 
the PNE 2030 (EPE 2007). 
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Table 8: Evolution of economic variables in PNE 2030 scenarios 
 A B1 B2 C 
Average Growth Rate of GDP - 2005-2030 period 5,1 4,1 3,2 2,2 
Net debt (% of GDP in 2030) 22,5 33,9 55,1 57,4 
Investment rate (% of GDP in 2030) 29,5 24,5 21,0 18,7 
Balance of trade balance (% of GDP in 2030) 0,3 0,5 1,8 2,2 
Balance in current account (% of GDP in 2030) -2,1 -1,3 -0,8 -0,2 
Sector Growth - Average growth rates in 2005-2030 - Agriculture 5,3 4,2 3,5 2,6 
Sector Growth - Average growth rates in 2005-2030 – Industry 4,2 3,7 3,0 2,2 
Sector Growth - Average growth rates in 2005-2030 – Services 5,1 4,2 3,2 2,2 
Sector Growth - Average growth rates in 2005-2030 – Brazil 5,1 4,1 3,2 2,2 
Source: PNE 2030 (EPE 2007) 
However, Borba et al. (2012), in their study, updated the scenario to better reflect the 
growth of the petroleum sector activities in Brazil and crude oil prices from PNE 2030 
were also altered to reflect the oil price threshold scenario adopted by Petrobras. 
Smart Grids Implementation Scenarios  
Lastly, one considers the three scenarios (conservative, moderate and fast) proposed by 
Duarte et al. (2015). Duarte et al. (2015) presented a Brazilian Roadmap, obtained under 
a R&D project approved by the Brazilian Energy Agency and the Brazilian Association 
of Distribution Companies. “The SG evolution is represented by the growing penetration 
of functionalities in clusters along the timeline.” The three scenarios types (slow, 
moderate and fast) “differ just on the definition of grid evolution parameters, as an 
increasing curve defined by four parameters”: 
• Pi - initial penetration of functionality (obtained from the diagnostic phase); 
• Ti – inflection year for increasing rate; 
• Tf – inflection year for penetration stabilization; 
• Pf – Final penetration of functionality; 
Finally, the next topic addresses some issues that needed especial attention during this 
research. 
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Attention Areas 
Some issues had to be took into consideration during this research. An important caveat 
here is that the extent of emissions reduction and the corresponding costs in the mitigation 
scenario are estimated relative to the baseline, whose definition is open to interpretation 
and judgement about a country’s future (Sathaye and Ravindranath 1998). 
Several studies reported significant gaps in the availability of infrastructure and climate 
data, which was perceived during this research. 
The hydroelectric expansion presents some challenges, particularly the limit of 72GW as 
the maximum possible to achieve without violating environmental and social constraints. 
Although the PNE 2030 aims to expand the hydro installed capacity by 87,7GW in big 
power plants and 7,0 GW in small power plants, which exceed the previous limitation, 
bringing some uncertainty related to the execution of the planned expansion. 
As Brazil has a power system that is mostly hydro and this source is complemented by 
others (and not a system that is complemented by hydro) it “must be assessed in terms of 
a more conservative indicator, such as firm power, to minimize the risk of power 
shortages” (Schaeffer et al. 2012). 
Methodologies to evaluate the use of SG as a mitigation and adaptation option for 
the energy sector  
This research aims to analyze the impact of smart grid in the power sector considering 
the expected effects of climate change and, in order to do that, some alternative 
approaches and related concepts are presented. 
McDowall & Eames (apud Martinot et al. 2007) offer a typology of energy future studies 
with two categories, which can be seen in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Energy future studies 
Category Type Description 
Descriptive Forecasts Predict likely futures from 
current trends, using 
extrapolation and modeling 
Exploratory scenarios Emphasize the drivers of 
possible futures, without 
specifying a predetermined end 
state 
Technical scenarios Explore technology possibilities 
and configurations, emphasizing 
the feasibility and implications 
of different options 
Normative Visions Elaborate desirable and 
plausible futures, emphasizing 
benefits 
Backcasts Start with a predetermined end 
point - a desirable (or 
constrained) future - and then 
investigate the pathways and 
technology configurations 
leading there 
Road maps Prescribe sequences of policies 
and measures 
Source: McDowall & Eames (apud Martinot et al. 2007) 
This phase of the research can be categorized as using descriptive technical scenarios but, 
also, used descriptive forecasts scenarios as input (information provided during the 
literature review from previous researches covering similar subjects) for the model. 
The climate change studies can also be organized into three categories according to 
Sathaye and Ravindranath (1998), as: 
• Inventory-of-GHG-emissions studies: quantify, for a given year, the level of GHG 
emissions and sequestration of carbon from all sources in a country;  
• Mitigation studies: project future GHG emissions and the economic and other 
implications of limiting their growth; and  
• Vulnerability and adaptation studies: estimate the impacts of climate change on a 
region or country and evaluate strategies to reduce or adapt to these impacts. 
Based on this categorization, this research is a vulnerability and adaptation study. 
Besides, in what concerns the model, Shafiei et al. (2015), in their research, used a model 
divided into four main modules to analyze the energy system in Iceland: 
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1) Energy supply: capacities and production costs of existing and future plants and 
calculates the amount of energy that can be available at the various estimated 
wholesale prices; 
2) Energy prices: attempts to equilibrate the demand with the supply curves of 
various plants by changing the offer prices; 
3) Refueling infrastructure: links the energy supply system to transport sector and 
determines the station service availability as an important factor that conditions 
the consumer preferences toward alternative fuels; and 
4) Energy demand: residential and commercial electricity demands increase in 
constant ratio to population growth, and the industrial electricity demand is linked 
to GDP. 
Moreover, EPE’s (2007) research to plan the expansion of the sector considered six main 
modules to analyze the energy system, which can be seen  in Figures 4 and 5. 
 
Figure 4: EPE's model construction (a) 
Source: EPE (2007) 
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Figure 5: EPE's model construction (b) 
Source: EPE (2007) 
This research only considers the points 1, 2, 3 and 6 from Figure 5, as the others are not 
directly related to the electric sector. 
Furthermore, Sathaye and Ravindranath (1998) proposed three approaches to evaluate the 
energy sector mitigation and adaptation options. These are presented in Figure 6 with 
some emphasis the ones which will be used in this research. 
 
Figure 6: Evaluation approaches 
Source: Adapted from Sathaye and Ravindranath (1998) 
And they can be described, according to Sathaye and Ravindranath (1998), as: 
• Multicriteria: permits the evaluation of mitigation options with respect to both 
quantifiable and non-quantifiable attributes. These approaches allow an explicit 
Bottom-up
Energy 
accounting 
models
LEAP
Engineering 
optimization 
models 
Iterative 
equilibrium 
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Multicritéria Top-down
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consideration of criteria, such as institutional capacity for implementation, that 
are difficult to quantify in terms of cost;  
• Top-down: analysis of the impact of changes in economic instruments, such as 
taxes and subsidies, on aggregate economic behavior, which is usually measured 
by a nation’s GDP. The approach explicitly includes feedback between the energy 
system and the other economic sectors as well as with the macroeconomic 
performance of the economy;  
• Bottom-up: provides a disaggregated picture of energy demand and supply and 
allows for estimation of potential gains in efficiency from specific technologies 
and/or the potential for substitution of less–carbon-intensive technologies. 
Furthermore, the nature of GHG mitigation assessments varies depending on the GHG 
producing activity or sector targeted. The bottom-up approach has a characteristic three-
step structure (Sathaye and Ravindranath 1998):  
1st. Evaluation of GHG reduction and carbon sequestration options:  
• Screening options that are to be evaluated and collecting data on their: 
▪ Technical performance; 
▪ Energy use; 
▪ Associated GHG emissions; 
▪ Costs; 
▪ Other attributes. 
2nd. Development of a baseline scenario:  
• Estimating GHG emissions or carbon storage in the target sector for a base 
year; 
• Projecting emissions assuming that current development trends continue, 
and no actions are undertaken to explicitly reduce GHG emissions; 
• Data on the activities that produce GHG emissions or offer opportunities 
for carbon storage.  
3rd. Development of GHG reduction, or mitigation, scenarios, including an 
estimation of scenario costs and GHG mitigation potential:  
• Assess and rank the GHG mitigation options that are appropriate to the 
country’s energy, economic, and social situation according to their 
potential impact on GHG emissions; 
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• The efficiency mitigation options may then be ranked in order of their 
increasing cost per ton of GHG reduced. 
For the energy sector, types of bottom-up models include the following (Sathaye and 
Ravindranath 1998): 
(1) Engineering optimization models – linear optimization programs in which the 
criterion is the total cost of providing economy-wide energy services under 
different scenarios. The models minimize the cost of providing energy and 
satisfying end-use demands, ensuring that the amount of energy supplied is at least 
equal to demand and does not exceed available resource limits. 
(2) Iterative equilibrium models – incorporate the dynamics of market processes 
related to energy via an explicit representation of the balancing of energy supply 
and demand. 
(3) Energy accounting models – basically spreadsheet programs in which energy 
flows are tracked along with related information such as carbon emissions. The 
models quantify the effects of mitigation policies, which must then be ranked 
according to the researcher’s judgment. 
LEAP, Long-range Energy Alternatives Planning System, according to LEAP and 
Ennergy Community (n.d.), is a software tool for energy policy analysis and climate 
change mitigation assessment developed at the Stockholm Environment Institute. This 
tool was chosen to be used during this research due to its (LEAP and Ennergy Community 
n.d.): 
• flexibility as is flexible enough for users with a wide range of expertise: from 
leading global experts who wish to design polices and demonstrate their benefits 
to decision makers to trainers who want to build capacity among young analysts 
who are embarking on the challenge of understanding the complexity of energy 
systems; 
• design, as LEAP is designed around the concept of scenario analysis; 
• low initial data requirements. Many modeling tools rely on very particular and 
often quite complex solution algorithms such optimization, and so tend to have 
highly inflexible data requirements. Developing the data for such models is a 
time-consuming task, requiring relatively high levels of expertise; and 
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• number of built-in tools that make it easy to create complex models and 
projections. 
LEAP is described as “an integrated, scenario-based modeling tool that can be used to 
track energy consumption, production and resource extraction in all sectors of an 
economy. It can be used to account for both energy sector and non-energy sector GHG 
emission sources and sinks.” 
Another approach was developed by Sathaye and Ravindranath (1998), when analyzing 
the baseline and mitigation scenarios by evaluating the factors contributing to CO2 
emissions, used the follow identity: 
Equation 1 
CO2 emissions = population * GDP per capita[R$/people] * Energy Intensity[TWh/R$] 
* Carbon Intensity[CO2/TWh] 
Note: GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
“Bottom-up approaches assume GDP and population growth rates as basic drivers for 
energy and CO2 emissions growth” and each part of Equation 1 can be described as 
(Sathaye and Ravindranath 1998): 
• Energy intensity provides an indication of a nation’s aggregate energy intensity 
or the energy needed to support a unit of economic activity; 
o Changes in this indicator may be caused either by structural change in the 
composition of GDP or by technical energy efficiency improvements; 
• Carbon intensity provides information on the carbon intensity of the mix of fuels 
that supply primary energy; 
o Changes in this indicator may be brought about by a change in the mix of 
fuels from coal to natural gas or other mitigation options.   
According to IEA (2011), the following regional characteristics need to be taken into 
account in any smart grid regional assessment: 
• Current and planned mix of supply, including fossil, nuclear and renewable 
generation; 
• Current and future demand, and sectoral make-up of demand, such as 
manufacturing industry, residential load prevalence or the deployment of electric 
vehicles; 
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• Status of existing and planned new transmission and distribution networks; 
• Ability to interconnect with neighboring regions; 
• Regulatory and market structure; 
• Climatic conditions and resource availability. 
Furthermore, “in many cases, modelling of electric energy consumption is multivariate, 
consisting of a mix of habits, climate and other important economic factors. The main 
constituents of these economic factors are energy prices, thermal electricity production, 
share, income, GDP, import and export values and energy demand index." 
(Giannakopoulos, Psiloglou, and Lemesios 2016). 
The projection of global climate change impacts is not in the scope of this thesis. The 
present research is focused on the climatic change impacts on the Brazilian energy sector, 
and it is based on the studies presented along the literature review. 
Now that the methodology was presented, Chapter IV addresses the case study in the 
Brazilian Power sector. 
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CHAPTER IV: IMPACT OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE 
POWER GENERATION SUPPLY AND ADAPTATION 
STRATEGIES: CASE STUDY IN THE BRAZILIAN POWER 
INDUSTRY 
This chapter will present a case study, considering the Brazilian power sector and 
following the methodology described in the Chapter III. The next section provides a 
portrait of the evolution of Brazilian power sector in the last years and the main features 
of the current situation.  Follows a presentation of the climatic projections and scenarios 
and the projected impacts of climate change on the Brazilian power sector. The last 
sections of this chapter present the expected impacts of SG for mitigating and adapting 
the sector and, finally, the results discussion. 
One of the specific goals of this research is to understand the Brazilian electric energy 
crisis. This knowledge provided a better ground for the definition of research scenarios 
and for the investigation of other smart grids applications compatible with climate change 
mitigation’s aim. 
Thus, with the purpose of providing a comprehensive portrait of the power sector in 
Brazil, it is important to know how it has been evolving since its creation, between 1880 
and 1900. In order to allow that, this section presents a literature review on Brazilian’s 
power industry depicting its marks, changes and its structure and regulations trough time. 
The Evolution of the Brazilian Electric System 
Not many years had passed since the 2001 electric crisis in Brazil and  the local specialists 
(Losekann 2015a; Queiroz 2015; Losekann 2015b; GEE n.d.) already talk about a new 
one.  
When analyzing the 2001 electric crisis, Lorenzo (2002) concluded that Brazilian electric 
crisis is not new for those who have been following and analyzing the evolution of the 
sector. It started in the end of the 19th century when electricity was introduced in Brazil 
by small private firms and local governments of small towns which provided power for 
the illumination of public places and for different types of economic activities. Moreover, 
different from what is presented today, most of the energy was thermal (Baer and 
McDonald 1998; Lorenzo 2002). 
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However, because of the abundance of water and easier access to hydraulic generation 
technologies, hydroelectricity started to be seen as a more efficient cost-effective 
alternative, with the use of thermal electricity in situations where the hydraulic potential 
was presented as modest, complex or costly use (Carneiro 2000). 
The initial development was slow (Centro da Memória da Eletricidade no Brasil, 1988; 
Magalhães, 2000 apud Carneiro 2000) but in the beginning of the twentieth century, 
foreign dealers marked the initial development of the electrical industry in Brazil. The 
main groups were:  
(1) Holding Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd., which controlled the 
production and distribution in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo and 
several small neighboring towns; and  
(2) American Share Foreign Power Company (Amforp), a subsidiary of American 
Bond and Share, which controlled the generation and distribution of electric 
energy in the upstate of São Paulo, Porto Alegre, Pelotas, Salvador, Recife, Natal, 
Vitória and upstate of Rio de Janeiro (Feliciano, 1988 apud Lorenzo 2002). 
“Soon, after Light entered the São Paulo transportation and electric power 
market, it overwhelmed smaller local competitors by either absorbing or by 
eliminating them. In 1904 the Canadian company founded the Rio de Janeiro 
Tramway, Light and Power Company. In 1905 it acquired a concession, which 
had been previously granted to a smaller firm, to furnish electricity through the 
use of hydroelectric power. Soon Light monopolized Rio de Janeiro's power, 
gas, tramway and telephone system (…) Light dominated the electric power 
supply in the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, other cities were supplied 
by small locally-owned firms and, by 1920, 343 electric power firms were 
operating in Brazil on a concessionary basis with municipalities” (Baer and 
McDonald 1998, 4). 
Thus, the oligopoly movement of the system increased during the twenties and led the 
Canadian Light group and United States company Amforp in a way that, in the transition 
to the thirties, the major markets and most of the installed generation capacity were 
already under the control of these two foreign corporations (Carneiro 2000; Baer and 
McDonald 1998). 
Besides, there weren´t relevant institutional barriers to the concentration and 
centralization of capital. So, foreign groups tended to impose their presence in the 
industry through aggressive acquisition policies and by merging companies based in the 
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area, a strategy that converged to oligopolistic clusters (Rose et al 1998 apud Carneiro 
2000). 
However, during the 1930s  
“the Federal Government began the institutional changes. All previous 
arrangements were suspended, including the old ‘gold clause’7. Both the 
precarious conditions of the Brazilian economy as the great world depression 
spread and also the impact of a nationalistic campaign (…) against the behavior 
and profits of foreign investors in the public utilities sector led to a decree in 
July 1934, known as the ‘Código das Águas’ (‘Water Code’)8, which became 
the basic legal instrument for the Federal Government to regulate the water and 
electric energy sectors” (Baer and McDonald 1998, 5). 
After that, private groups could “operate only under a concession granted by the Federal 
Government for the duration of 30 years” and “at the end of this period the assets of the 
concessionaire would revert to the state”, with or without compensation (Baer and 
McDonald 1998, 5). 
Furthermore, since the 1920s, it became strong, in industrially developed countries, the 
idea that the Government should compete9 with private exploration to reduce the price of 
electricity (Lorenzo 2002).  
In what concerns the water code, it came to change the situation in the power sector where 
companies, especially Light, obtained spectacular profits (Lorenzo 2002).  
However, after 1939 with the creation of the National Council of Water and Power, which 
imposed the review of contracts and concessions, the companies argued that they were 
discouraged to invest because they were undercapitalized by applying the principle of 
historical cost, and also because of the prices that were increasing continuously during 
the late 1930s (Lorenzo 2002). 
                                                          
7 The gold clause guaranteed the readjustment of tariffs due to exchange rate variation. 
8 “The Water Code was the first comprehensive legislation on power in Brazil” (Baer and McDonald 1998, 
5). It set up a mechanism to supervise firms receiving a concession, ensuring adequate service at "fair" 
tariffs which would be fixed, taking into account costs, depreciation, and a reasonable rate of return on 
investments and also would be based on historical cost of capital, and allow a rate of return of 10%. This 
would be the main reason of discussion in the following years, as Light and Amforp would constantly ask 
for a rate based on replacement cost (Tendler apud BAER and McDonald 1998, 5). 
9 State interventions occurred in Austria, Germany, Switzerland and England, where the Electricity Supply 
Act, 1926, provides, through the Central Electricity Board, a quasi-socialized system for the regulation of 
private industries (Lorenzo 2002). According to Guinle (1933 apud Lorenzo 2002), between 1910 and 1930 
tariffs were lowered in those countries from 100 to 25 (where there were public companies) and from 100 
to 50 in the United States, where there was no regulatory laws. 
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Although, “the principle of tariffs based on historical cost was part of the law, it did not 
play a role in determining it, due to both, political pressures and to bureaucratic 
difficulties in implementing it”. But, “from 1937 to 1945, no new concessions were given 
to foreign companies”, the “government regulation of the sector was delegated to the 
National Council for Water and Electric Energy until 1960, when this was transferred to 
a freshly created Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME)” (Baer and McDonald 1998, 5–
6). 
Moreover, according to Lorenzo (2002), imposing difficulties to import electrical 
equipment also contributed to the expansion of installed capacity, as helped to develop 
local industry. In addition, the expansion of demand from the accelerated process of 
urbanization, the spread of the use of appliances and industrialization, increased 
uncertainty about the electricity supply in Brazil (Lorenzo 1997 apud Lorenzo 2002). 
According to Pereira (1975 apud Lorenzo 2002) it created a major impasse where, on the 
one hand, the government did not have the capital, technology and sufficient management 
capacity to encompass and expand public electricity services provided by foreign 
concessionaires. On the other hand, foreign companies could not get the best rates, 
favored currency regulation and safety for new capital contributions because of the 
political uncertainties arising from the intensification of nationalist forces.  
As pointed by Lorenzo (2002), the most dynamic Brazilian industrial development was 
between Rio and São Paulo, where also was the big problem on the electricity supply. 
Light, the dealership in the region since the 1940s, had exhausted the hydroelectric 
potential, relying instead on expanding the capacity of existing plants and, because of 
this, there was recurring power outages in the center of the country's economy. In addition 
to the delay in treatment for new installations and, therefore, featuring pent-up demand 
situation, there were frequent supply disruptions and sharp drops in voltage, which caused 
serious obstacles to economic development (Tendler 1968 apud Lorenzo 2002). 
Besides, “with the decline of investments in the sector during the 1930s and 1940s, Brazil 
began to experience increasingly severe power shortages, which led to long periods of 
power rationing” and “given the increasing uncertainty over future returns on 
investments, both Light and Amforp had little incentive to finance major projects” (Baer 
and McDonald 1998, 6). 
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Then, as expected, the Cook mission in Brazil, in the first half of the 1940s, “pointed the 
electric power sector as being one of the major ‘bottlenecks’ for the country's industrial 
growth and recommended greater planning and the interconnection of various power 
systems”. This resulted, in 1946, “in a National Electrification Plan, which emphasized 
region interconnections” but also requested for “investments to be concentrated in small 
and medium-sized power plants, with the state acting as coordinator” (Baer and 
McDonald 1998, 6). 
Thus a new strategy began, in 1954, related to division of activities in the sector, leaving 
the federal and state public enterprises in charge of the expansion of generation capacity 
and interconnection of the electricity system, while foreign companies - Light and 
Amforp - would specialize in distribution (Lorenzo 2002). 
To help overcome the Southeast supply problems, the Federal Company Furnas Electric 
Central was built, in 1957, in Grande river, with high-energy use. This plant went into 
operation in 1963 in the middle of the supply crisis (aggravated by the occurrence of a 
year of drought when the dam of Billings in Sao Paulo became  almost completely empty), 
and was able to avoid rationing and serious inconvenience to the population and industries 
(Feliciano, 1988 apud Lorenzo 2002). 
Finally, the state's presence consolidation in the energy sector took place in 1965 as 
presented in Table 10, by Baer and McDonald (1998), which represents the transition 
from private domination in the electricity sector to public domination. 
Table 10: Transition from private domination to public domination in the electricity sector in Brazil 
 Public Private Intra-Firm Supply Total 
 Power Share Power Share Power Share Power Share 
 (MW) (%) (MW) (%) (MW) (%) (MW) (%) 
1952 135.6 6.8 1,635.5 82.4 213.7 10.8 1,984.8 100.0 
1955 538.5 17.1 2,248.4 71.4 361.6 11.5 3,148.5 100.0 
1958 824.5 20.6 2,742.8 68.7 425.8 10.7 3,993.1 100.0 
1960 1,098.9 22.9 3,182.2 66.3 519.0 10.8 4,800.1 100.0 
1962 1,791.9 31.3 3,161.4 55.2 775.5 13.5 5,728.8 100.0 
1965 4,048.0 54.6 2,486.2 33.6 876.8 11.8 7,411.0 100.0 
Source: Panorama, p. 150; Políticas, p. 72. apud Baer & McDonald, 1998 
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The interconnection of electrical systems, as recommended by the Cook mission, became 
the keynote of the Brazilian electric sector comprising increasingly wide areas and a 
growing number of dealers resulting into more rational energy production which, 
consequently, made possible to reduce overall costs, irrigating the country with cheap 
electricity, resulting in the achieved economic growth (Ibidem, p.53 apud Lorenzo 2002). 
However, these expansions occurred under quite problematic conditions and the use of 
external financing, at a time of unfavorable international situation, brought serious 
consequences for the evolution of the sector and that was one of the main causes of the 
crisis that took place during 1970s and 1980s (Lorenzo 2002). 
According to Baer and McDonald (1998) and Eletrobrás (2015), since the 1970s the 
sector was in state’s hands and, in the subsequent decades, lots of investments were made 
to expand generation capacity by building big power plants, interconnecting various state-
owned companies and building transmission lines. Besides, the establishment of a 
cooperation agreement with Germany on a nuclear energy program, which came to 
minimize concerns about projections pointing a large growth in electricity consumption 
in the Southeast and the possible exhaustion of the hydroelectric resources of the country 
until the late 1980s. 
From 1974, Brazil tried to maintain its posture and the previous pattern of a forced march 
towards development (Lorenzo 2002). However, the inflation and external indebtedness 
process started getting out of the country’s control because of the contraction movement 
of the world economy. With the debt crisis, in 1981-1982, and the disruption of financial 
flows, Brazil had entered a recession that led to a rapid expansion of domestic debt and, 
during the 1980s, there was a substantial reduction in the ability of the state to mobilize 
resources for investment (Lorenzo 2002). 
However, according to Baer and McDonald (1998, 8), during the period of state 
dominance the installed capacity, in the power sector, “expanded from 6,355 MW in 1963 
to 42,860 MW in 1984 and 52,741 MW in 1993” though, “most investments in the 1970s 
were concentrated on power generation, while resources going into transmission and 
distribution were limited. This created serious sectoral and regional disproportions in the 
1980s”. 
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Another asymmetry factor between the different regions in Brazil was related with the 
tariffs, as stated by Eletrobrás (2015). Therefore, the government, in the end of the 1970s, 
decided to balance the electricity tariffs in Brazil, creating the Global Guarantee Reserve, 
which was a new fund that would be administered by Eletrobrás, in order to eliminate 
differences that were discouraging investment in the North and Northeast, and so, boost 
regional development. This fund allowed the transfer of Southeast resource companies - 
mainly from Light and Power Plants of São Paulo (also known as CESP) - to utilities of 
smaller and poorer markets, which had often incompatible costs (Eletrobrás, 2015). 
However, the main aspect of the sector in the end of the 1970s, according to Lorenzo 
(2002), was its concessionaires financial crisis, when rates experienced constant 
reductions in their real value, it began a progressive indebtedness process that led to the 
default and the loss of sectoral efficiency. 
In addition, the establishment of the tariff equalization principle to the average interest 
rate for the sector as a whole, without taking into account the characteristics of each 
company, aggravated even more the financial framework of the utilities. This happened 
because any productivity gains that a company would achieve was transferred to another 
dealer, so that the average rate was kept (Lorenzo 2002). As mentioned by Lorenzo 
(2002), all these problems generated different types of pressure on the electricity sector, 
especially with regard to high operating costs and also in the work plans of power 
companies. 
As expected, “during the 1980s the capacity of Brazil's public sector to invest in 
infrastructure deteriorated progressively. In the power sector, the investments declined 
from US$ 8.3 billion in 1982 to US$ 3.2 billion in 1993” (Baer and McDonald 1998, 10). 
According to Eletrobrás (2015), the worsening of the Brazilian economic crisis in the 
early 90s, quite affected the electricity sector, starting with systematic delay payment of 
the energy supplied by federal enterprises and by Itaipu Binational. The debt of these 
companies came to the equivalent of US$ 5 billion and, in that context, the work program 
recommended by the Plan 2010 was practically paralyzed, which increased their financial 
cost at over US$ 1 billion a year (Eletrobrás, 2015). 
Furthermore, as said by Lorenzo (2002), the electricity industry entered 1990 in a very 
delicate situation: 
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• the state was no longer able to invest in the sector; 
• companies found themselves in debt, unable to continue their expansion plans; 
• the possibility of a power failure from the beginning of the decade was also a 
reality. 
The resolution of the financial problems of power companies should go through an equity 
adjustment, and privatization was presented as one of the ideal alternative for this to occur 
(Lorenzo 2002). So, “the continuing fiscal crisis of the Brazilian state in the mid-1990s 
led to the decision, by the government, to expand the privatization process of public 
utilities” (Baer and McDonald 1998, 10). 
For Baer and McDonald (1998, 11–12) three important changes were made during the 
1990s: 
• National System for Electric Energy Transmission was established in 1993: this 
new institution made possible for any private firm which has energy capacity to 
have access to the national transmission grid; 
• Change in legislation in 1995: eliminated the differentiation between private 
domestic and foreign firms, and thus allowed the latter to bid for concessions in 
the electricity sector; 
• Creation of a new regulatory agency in 1996: National Electric Energy Agency 
(ANEEL). 
Baer and McDonald (1998, 12) also pointed that “the aim of the government was to create 
competition among private firms in the generation of electricity and in its distribution, 
while the transmission lines would remain in the public sector”. 
The general trend of Eletrobrás planners in the first two years of this new century was to 
draft a new expansion of electricity supply, with the participation of the private sector and 
the increasing use, not only of the country's hydroelectric potential, but also of its thermal 
sources (Eletrobrás, 2015). 
The electricity sector began to include private and public companies, and the operational 
coordination began to be a responsibility of the National System Operator (ONS) with 
private nature but created by government initiative, based on the rules of the Coordinated 
Operation Integrated Group (Lorenzo, 2002). 
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Wholesale Energy Market, another private nature company, manages the sale of electric 
energy in the Interconnected System and the state's presence in the sector is predominant, 
as it controls 78% of generation, 100% of major transformation and 30% of the 
distribution (Lorenzo, 2002). 
Within the federal government, the responsibilities were distributed between the MME 
and the regulator ANEEL. This decision assignment has not its limits always clear, 
originating disputes between these entities and private coordinating bodies (Lorenzo, 
2002). 
Between 1995 and 2004, the Brazilian electric sector changed and, after 2004, the new 
model of the sector was fully implemented. The differences between the models can be 
seen in Table 11. 
Table 11: Differences between the electric sector’s models 
Old Model (until 1995) 
Free Market Model (1995 to 
2003) 
New Model (2004) 
Financing through public 
resources 
Financing through public and 
private resources 
Financing through public and 
private resources 
Vertical companies 
Companies divided by activity: 
generation, transmission, 
distribution and 
commercialization 
Companies divided by activity: 
generation, transmission, 
distribution, marketing, import 
and export. 
State-owned enterprises 
Openness and Emphasis on 
Enterprise Privatization 
Coexistence between State and 
Private Companies 
Monopolies - No competition 
Competition in generation and 
commercialization 
Competition in generation and 
commercialization 
Captive Consumers Free and Captive Consumers Free and Captive Consumers 
Tariffs regulated in all segments 
Prices freely negotiated in 
generation and sale 
In the free environment: Prices 
freely negotiated in generation 
and sale. In the regulated 
environment: auction and tender 
for the lowest tariff 
Regulated Market Free market 
Coexistence between Free and 
Regulated Markets 
Determining Planning - 
Coordinating Group of 
Electrical Systems Planning 
(GCPS) 
Indicative Planning by the 
National Energy Policy Council 
(CNPE) 
Planning by the Energy Research 
Company (EPE) 
Hiring: 100% of the Market 
Hiring: 85% of the market (up to 
August 2003) and 95% market 
(up to Dec. 2004) 
Hiring: 100% of the market + 
reserve 
Energy balance surpluses / 
deficits 
Energy balance surpluses / 
deficits settled in the MAE 
(Wholesale Energy Market) 
 
Energy balance surpluses / 
deficits settled at CCEE 
(Chamber of Electric Energy 
commercialization). Mechanism 
of Offset and Deficit 
Compensation (MCSD) for 
Distributors. 
Source: CCEE 2017 
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Table 11 presented the old, the transitional and the current models used in the electric 
sector, from a state owned regulated market to a mix between state and private companies 
and regulated and free market. It also shows the difference in the amount of energy hired 
comparing to the marketing, from 100%, to less than the total needed, and back to 100% 
with an increase of reserve, which raised the security of the system. 
Continuing the historical description, more recently, in 2013, to reduce the final price of 
electricity, it was implemented the provisional measure (MP) 579 which reduce the tariffs 
and radically changed the way the Brazilian electricity sector was financed. 
According to Almeida (2014), the tariff reduction in the electricity sector caused a 
immediately impact on the financial sector, companies in the electricity sector suffered 
on the stock market during this year. Even companies that were not directly affected by 
the MP 579 also suffered therefore, in the stock market because it created an idea in Brazil 
that it could happen to the other companies, particularly to distribution operators. 
The companies started to have difficulties getting financing, as the MP 579 reduced the 
tariff through the withdrawal of charges and placed on the national treasury the 
responsibility to make these financings. Several  costs are no more at the expense of 
consumer after the MP 579,  like the “light for all” program or the input for generation in 
the isolated system) (Almeida 2014). 
Almeida (2014) points out that the tariff is a recurrent issue in the Brazilian electric sector 
history that needs a tariff that is sufficient to cover the costs and ensure the expansion of 
the system. He also states that one of the greatest challenges of the Brazilian electricity 
sector is how to guarantee cheap energy and reduce the tariffs at the same time. This may 
be not sustainable as it depends if tariffs revenue will guarantee cost coverage and sector 
expansion in the long term. 
The Brazilian electric sector, historically, has three main energy policy goals, according 
to Losekann (2013): (1) security of supply; (2) tariff modality; and (3) challenge to 
increase clean energy into the system. And, the main characteristics of the Brazilian 
system, which allowed the adequacy of these energy policy objectives (Losekann 2013) 
can be described as: (1) predominance of hydroelectricity; (2) large reservoirs; and (3) 
thermal backup of little relevance. 
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However, according to Losekann (2013), the current situation is difficult to be maintained 
because of: 
• Limited hydroelectric expansion, due to environmental restrictions; 
• Less relevant reservoirs, due to environmental restrictions; 
• Introduction of intermittent renewables (wind, small hydro, solar, …); and 
• Thermoelectric dispatch – the thermoelectric power plants in Brazil were built to 
be dispatched only during critical times, however, it was being dispatched almost 
all the time to attend the demand due to reservoirs’ low levels. 
Besides, Losekann (2015a) declared that there was a crisis in the sector and that crisis has 
four dimensions: 
1) Supply crisis and the new risk of a new electricity rationing in the coming years; 
2) Economic downturn, the financial situation is completely disorganized (MP 579);  
3) Structural constraints; 
o Main hydropower stations are far from the load centers and doesn’t have 
reservoirs; 
o Difficulty in implementing projects (especially environmental); 
o High risk of new hydroelectric projects delay; 
o Penetration of intermittent renewable sources - bioenergy, solar and wind 
(pose challenges in the operation of the system) 
o Thermoelectric generating plant not suitable for the Brazilian problem - 
very expensive thermals were contracted, which are not ideal to be 
dispatching electricity all the time; 
o Long-term marginal costs of electricity production in the country is 
increasing (auction A-1 in December 2016 R$ 118,15 / MWh) – Figures 7 
to 12, present the evolution of energy prices in auctions in Brazil between 
2005 and 2016 (prices in R$/MWh). 
4) Difficulty of expansion in the current circumstances (hydroelectric in the 
Amazon, thermal fuel very expensive, etc.). 
In order to complement the information above, Figures 7 to 12 presents the prices of 
auctions in Brazil between 2005 and 2016 (prices in R$/MWh). 
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Figure 7: Price of energy acquired in the UHE (Hydroelectric Power Plant with more than 300 MW of 
installed capacity) auction 
Source: Source: Data from CCEE 2017 
The UHE (Hydroelectric Plant) does not show any increase as it represents the energy 
from different new hydro power plants; besides, hydropower from big hydropower plants 
is the less expensive power source in the country. 
 
Figure 8: Price of energy acquired in the adjust auction 
Source: Data from CCEE 2017 
According to CCEE (n.d.), adjustment Auctions aim to complement the energy load 
necessary to meet the consumer market of the distribution concessionaires, up to a limit 
of 5% of that load. Figure 8 shows a substantial increase in the prices after November-
2011, when the prices increased from R$73,63 to R$397,14. 
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Figure 9: Price of energy acquired in the reserve power auction 
Source: Data from CCEE 2017 
The reserve energy is intended to increase security of supply in the National 
Interconnected System (SIN). The prices for reserve energy are increasing too, with a 
small drop after December-2015. 
 
Figure 10: Price of energy acquired in the existing power auction 
Source: Data from CCEE 2017 
Figure 10 presented the selling prices in the electricity auctions from existing facilities. 
The prices experienced a fast increase between November-2011 and April-2014 (rapid 
increase due to change in auctions from big power plants generation to small power 
plants, natural gas and biomass). However, after that, it started to decrease again (less 
expensive natural gas). 
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Figure 11: Price of energy acquired in the new energy auction 
Source: Data from CCEE 2017 
Figure 11 is related to the auctions for the purchase of electric energy from new generation 
projects, which also experienced an increase during 2014 
 
Figure 12: Price of energy acquired in the Alternative sources auction 
Source: Data from CCEE 2017 
Finally, the alternative sources also got more expensive when comparing the first and 
second with the third auction.  
As shown in Figures 7 to 12, the prices of electricity showed an increasing tendency, even 
considering the auction, which was introduced in the new model to guarantee the lowest 
tariff for the captive consumers. 
As mentioned before, the participation of thermal generation in Brazil has been increasing 
and Figure 13 presents the thermal source participation in the electric mix between 1970 
and 2015 and Figure 14 presents the sales price (R$/MWh) in the auctions for thermal 
generation (renewable and non-renewable sources) between 2011 and 2016. 
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Notes: Thermal Generation includes renewable and non-renewable sources and exclude thermonuclear 
generation; the generation corresponds to the combination of public and self-producers power plants 
Figure 13: Evolution of Thermal Generation in Brazil 
Source: Ministério de Minas e Energia 2015a 
 
Figure 14: Price that energy was acquired in the Alternative sources auction 
Source: Data from CCEE 2017 
As presented in Figures 13 and 14, the participation of thermals in the load is growing 
fast and the costs of thermal are very high (even natural gas) then, this raises the price of 
electric energy to a value that is not acceptable to the consumer. 
Nowadays there are some controversial opinions related to the sector’s next steps. 
According to ABRACE (Brazilian Association of Large Industrial Energy Consumers 
and Free Consumers) (2013), the world looks at energy, especially the United States and 
Europe, under two perspectives:  
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• Energy policies: the strategic security perspective with the United States avoiding 
relying on Middle Eastern oil and Europe somewhat vulnerable to Russia's gas 
supply); and 
• Climate Change: where they need to clean the energy matrix eliminating or 
reducing the use of fossil fuels.  
Based on these two perspectives, ABRACE (2013) made the following comparison: in 
Brazil, there is another reality, the country has renewable energy in great quantity and 
should be not looking at what other countries are doing and following in their steps 
because the Brazilian’s problem is competitiveness. Brazil is already at a renewable use 
level that is far ahead Europe and U.S. So, ABRACE questioned why not focus on what 
is interesting for the nation: competitiveness to have development, employment, equalize 
the trade balance and investment in the country. 
On the other hand, for Dutra (2015), the situation presented by ABRACE (2013) is 
changing, the country was living in a very unique condition with great capacity and large 
reservoirs, but now, with the crisis of the reservoirs, the increase of the thermals, the 
increase of intermittent renewable sources; all of that is bringing Brazil closer to the other 
countries. 
Moreover, according to Zanfelice (2015), the problem still has another side, Brazil is one 
of the countries that have the best resources in the world, great winds and, maybe,  one 
of the best insolation conditions, it has great hydroelectric plants and still producing 
electricity with such expensive tariffs. 
Furthermore, for Queiroz (2015), the model of the electric sector in Brazil is exhausted, 
the country is experiencing a structural crisis that goes beyond the issue of lack or not of 
water. On the one hand, there is an institutional model that is already exhausted and on 
the other hand a group of state-owned companies that are practically broken from the MP 
579. 
In spite of this, for Zanfelice (2015), it was not the MP 579 that caused the problem which 
Brazil is experiencing, what it did was to drain all available financial resources that the 
electricity sector had at hand and, also states that, to get out of the problems the sector 
needs: 
• Generate fund; 
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• Better define the institutions limits as they do not know what their role really are; 
• Create an energy policy – to Zanfelice (2015), maybe the power sector has had an 
energy policy in the past but it doesn’t have one for a long time - today it puts any 
cheaper source that exists; this is not energetic policy, this is ideology. 
Finally, Losekann (2015b) divided the nowadays crisis in three phases as being: 
• First phase: scarcity crisis where the basic concern was about the supply and the 
risk of rationing (peak at the end of 2014); 
• Second phase: disruption of the sector’s finances. The government focused on 
actions driven by the equalization of the distributors’ situation and reduction of 
the price; 
• Third phase: the currently one, judicial phase. Legal dispute over the losses of the 
hydroelectric generators, which have to acquire energy in the short-term market 
with higher prices to meet their contracts since the water to generation has been 
reducing since 2012 (only in 2015 this loss was estimated at around R$12 billion). 
The generators’ owners understand that they should not bear the totality of these 
losses because the decisions that resulted in the emptying of the reservoirs and in 
the hydroelectric generation crisis are decisions made by the ONS and not 
business decisions. 
As noted during the current literature review and emphasized by Lorenzo (2002) the crisis 
in the electricity sector is not new. The previous and currently problems in the power 
sector were driven by administration decisions, lack of investment, depletion of water 
resources and difficulty in meeting the growing demand common in a developing country. 
Therefore, it is also important that the proposed solution could help making better 
decisions, enhance the sector ability to assure security even with lack of investments and 
water deficit. 
The historical data related to the evolution of the electricity sector in Brazil can be found 
in the Appendix B. 
More information on the evolution of the Brazilian Power Industry can be found in 
(Centro da Memória da Eletricidade no Brasil 2015; Lorenzo 2002; Baer and McDonald 
1998; Grupo de Economia da Energia). 
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Climate Change in Brazil 
Some studies approaching climate change have being done in Brazil during the last years. 
In what concerns the expected effects in Brazil, Perazzoli, Pinheiro, and Kaufmann, 
(2013) use IPCC climate scenarios A2 and B2  to simulate basin behavior over the period 
2071–2100 and compared it with that in the baseline period (1961–1990). They found out 
a  “reduction in river flow of 39.2% and 41.2%, respectively” and that “flood peaks could 
reach more extreme values in the future, especially under scenario A2”. 
Besides, “rainfall and evapotranspiration are the most affected, and such changes may 
affect water availability and sediment production, as well as modifying the hydrological 
regime and river basin response” as “for both A2 and B2 scenarios, values are lower than 
for baseline conditions” (Perazzoli, Pinheiro, and Kaufmann 2013). 
Hirata and Conicelli (2012), studyed the expected impact of long-term climate change on 
Brazilian aquifers by 2050. They concluded that climate change will lead to a 70% 
reduction in recharge in aquifers in the Northeast region (compared to 2010 values), 
ranging from 30% to 70% in the North. South and Southeast regions are expected to 
increase in relative recharge values of 30% to 100%. The demand is expected to increase, 
and the availability of surface water will decrease making the population turn to aquifers 
as their main source of water for public or private use in many regions of the country. 
Another climate change research in Brazil was conducted by Krol et al. (2006) in the 
Northeast region using integrated simulations, where the model analyzed the region 
sensitivity to climate change, on scoping pathways of regional development and assessing 
policy interventions related to dam construction and agricultural alternatives. They found 
out that those changes could impact water availability in a significant level that should be 
considered in long-term water policies. 
When assessing the effects of market-based mechanisms and carbon emission restrictions 
on the Brazilian energy system under different scenarios for carbon taxes and abatement 
targets up to 2050, Lucena et al. (2015) found out an increase in emission in the baseline 
scenario due to higher penetration of natural gas and coal. However, climate policy 
scenarios indicated that while taxes up to 32 US$/tCO2e do not significantly reduce 
emissions, higher taxes (from 50 US$/tCO2e in 2020 to 162US$/tCO2e in 2050) induce 
average emission reductions around 60% when compared to the baseline. 
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Salvo et al. (2015), when studying the ecological footprint of many sectors in Brazil, 
found out that the biggest chunk of Brazil’s ecological footprint is due to its carbon 
footprint and, in particular, emissions from cattle. Only a few economic sectors exhibit 
high ecological footprint values, chiefly those belonging to livestock farming and energy 
production based on fossil fuels. Export-oriented sectors have below-average ecological 
footprint values (excluding the soybeans and slaughter sectors). The percentage of 
Brazil’s ecological footprint due to household consumption (excluding imports) is three 
times bigger than that attributable to exports, with sectors belonging to livestock farming 
contributing the most to such disparity. So, the authors concluded that the environmental 
impact of the Brazilian economy could be drastically reduced by tackling the emission-
intensive production processes of a few sectors only and by disincentivize the domestic 
consumption of a narrow range of products, especially from the livestock segment. 
Carvalho et al. (2015), simulated the impact of climate change on potential sugarcane 
yield in Goiana and Itambé, Zona da Mata of Pernambuco. They inferred that Zona da 
Mata region can be strongly affected by climate changes, reflecting on a future climate 
with increased temperature (maximum and minimum) and reduced rainfall, which could 
reduce the potential sugarcane yield, and that could already be perceived in the near future 
(2014 e 2040). 
Furthermore, Pereira et al. (2013) when refining the analysis of the impacts of the global 
climatic changes in the wind energy potentials in Brazil concluded that the Eta-HadCM3 
model forecasts for future climate scenario A1B indicate a tendency for an average of 
15% e 30% growth in the wind power density inland for most of the Northeast region of 
Brazil, with some regional intensification of more than 100% mainly in the north sector 
of this region. A decreasing trend in wind power density is expected for the future climate, 
particularly along the coast of Bahia state. The South region of Brazil exhibited a mild 
growing trend for wind power density as compared to the Northeast region, about 10%, 
peaking to more than 20% in some areas. Therefore, it is possible to expect that the overall 
impact of the global climate changes on the wind power in the Northeast and South 
regions of Brazil might be favourable to the profitability of existing and future wind 
projects in both regions. 
Complementarily, Lucena et al. (2010) also researched the possible impacts of global 
climate change on the wind power potential of Brazil. Despite using different models and 
84 
 
scenarios from Pereira et al. (2013) ( HadCM3 general circulation model and A2 and B2 
scenarios), they arrived to the same conclusion: wind power potential in Brazil would not 
be jeopardized in the future due to possible new climate conditions; improved wind 
conditions are expected, particularly in the Northeast coast of the country; and 
investments in wind power generation can be an interesting way to expand renewable 
energy production in Brazil. 
Krol et al. (2001) tried to understand how climate, water resources, agriculture and society 
influence each other and evaluate the Semi-arid north-east (SIM) model. Their study 
concluded that a regional integrated model showed itself a suitable tool for complex and 
interdisciplinary studies. SIM showed a successful integration of models over the 
complete causal chain climate - water availability - agriculture - socio-economic impacts; 
the model offers an effective integrated framework for model design and testing. It has 
the potential to perform scenario analyzes, including studies of regional impacts of global 
change, but also of the effectiveness of regional policies on water management and land 
use, as responses to climate variability and possible global change. 
Moreover, Schaeffer et al. (2009) analyzed the possible effects of climate change on 
energy supply and demand in the Brazil, using the A2 and B2 scenarios and the PNE 2030 
projections. They concluded that Brazilian society should not only invest on renewable 
energy but also in studies to use them properly.The Brazilian energy system is vulnerable 
to climate change as all simulations for different sources, except the sugarcane, show a 
downward trend in energy supply to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the region. 
Brazil's vulnerability is as intense as its reliance on renewable energy sources, mainly 
hydroelectricity and the Northeast will be the most affected region, both in the production 
of hydroelectric power, due to the reduction of flows in the São Francisco river basin, as 
in the production of biodiesel and wind energy. Some cultures of oil, such as castor beans 
and soybeans, may become unviable with the temperature rises and drought projected for 
the region, and the lowest wind speeds planned for inside northeastern can cause a 
reduction of up to 60% in potential national wind. 
Andrade et al. (2012) conducted a research aiming to identify how global climate change 
could affect hydroelectric power companies’ internal and external factors, and how they 
could include responses to potential social, economic and operational performance risks 
in their strategic planning. The study considered the Northeast region, used the A2 and 
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B2 scenarios up to 2050 and, as a result, they found out that the main electric company 
in the region, CHESF, would require the investment in innovative technologies to adapt 
to the impacts that climate change could have on water resources; could also adapt by 
using the energy potential of wind, sun, ocean waves and tidal; and by improving 
efficiency. 
Another study was performed by Arroyo (2012), who analyzed the impacts of climate 
change in the mineral coal thermal power plant in Brazil through a case study in the 
CTSUL (South Thermoelectric Plant) power plant.  The main conclusions were that: the 
availability of water would not represent a problem to the power plant as the amount of 
water needed is only 0,67 m3/s; during the summer, the higher temperature will negatively 
affect the generation decreasing the efficiency; and during the winter, the higher 
temperature would affect the generation by increasing the efficiency allowing the power 
plant to generate more energy using less mineral coal. 
Lastly, Lucena et al. (2012b) analyzed the impacts that global climate change could have 
on hydroelectric production in Brazil and concluded that the reliability of hydroelectric 
generation in Brazil could be compromised. In some regions, such as North and 
Northeast, hydropower production may be affected because the water availability in these 
regions is expected to decrease significantly. tTransmission lines all over the country can 
become more vulnerable to potential high winds, especially in the South, but the possible 
impacts cannot be predicted with currently available models; in some places, such as in 
the Parnaíba and Atlântico Leste basin, the average loss in electricity generated may 
exceed 80% (firm energy). 
Many researches had been conducted in different countries, in order to assess the local / 
regional impacts of global climate change.  All of them have similar conclusions, as Brazil 
is vulnerable to climate change because its high share of renewable sources, especially 
hydro, the wind potential in the shore area of north of Northeast region is expected to 
increase; the hydrogeneration in expected to dramatically reduce; and the impacts are also 
expected to reduce the biofuels production. 
To reduce these negative impacts, it is necessary to reduce the GHG emission and 
implement adaptation strategies to decrease the vulnerability to those effects. 
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Information about GHG emission in Brazil is available in the Appendix A and Appendix 
B. 
Vulnerability to climate change 
The impacts resulting from changes in climate are directly connected to the vulnerability 
to which natural and human systems are exposed (Soito and Freitas 2011). One of the 
main effects of climate change is the increase frequency of extreme events. Figures 15 to 
19 present the historic evolution of natural disasters in Brazil from 1991 to 2012. 
 
 
Figure 15: Total Natural Disasters in Brazil 
Source: CEPED - Univeristy Center for Studies and Research on Disasters (2013) 
Figure 15 shows the percentage of total natural disasters, occurred between 1991 and 
2012. The concentration of disasters in the more recent years indicate an increasing 
tendency in the occurrence of these events. 
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Figure 16: Comparative occurrence per decades 
Source: CEPED (2013) 
From Figure 16 it is possible to see the dramatic increase in the number of disasters, for 
all the types from the 1990 decade to 2000 decade. 
 
 
Figure 17: Mensal disasters occurrence per region 
Source: CEPED (2013) 
After analyzing each region, one can notice that the disasters have a seasonal behavior 
(see Figure 17) and it is slightly different for each region as they all have its unique 
climate and environmental characteristics. 
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Figure 18: Comparative occurrence per year 
Source: CEPED (2013) 
The occurrence of drought and dry periods was very high during the second decade and 
had a dramatic increase during 2012. 
It is also interesting to notice that flood and drought and dry periods presented a 
complementary behavior, one increases in the years when the other drops down. 
 
Figure 19: All events registered in Brazil between 1991 and 2012 
Source: CEPED (2013) 
Considering all the events, it is possible to conclude that the coastal area or, the most 
populous areas, are the most vulnerable areas to climate disaster in Brazil. 
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Other details on the occurrence of natural disasters in Brazil can be seen with more detail 
in CEPED (2013). 
Major mitigation and adaptation efforts can reduce the magnitude of future impacts, but, 
given the specificities of each sector and region, it is necessary to analyze the expected 
impacts for the energy sector. 
According to World Bank (2010) apud PBMC (2014), with regard to extreme events and 
its impact in Brazil, the country experienced the first hurricane ever observed in the South: 
Hurricane Catarina, occurred in March 2004. In the South and Southeast of Brazil, heavy 
rains have been more frequent in the last 50 years and agricultural productivity will be 
for sure affected, not only in these regions in Brazil but worldwide: However, that will 
happen especially in the tropics, threatening the food security of many countries. 
Some researches were conducted with the purpose of identifying changes in the natural 
cycles, which can be related with the climate change. However, there are not many 
reviews of long-term variability and extreme weather and climate in the country (maybe 
because there is not enough history – climate changes are a recent phenomenon/research 
topic). Some studies have been done for specific regions such as South America, but one 
of the challenges that hamper the progress of this type of analysis has been the lack of 
weather information with good quality in long-term series. 
The Amazon and northeastern Brazil constitute what might be called climatic change hot 
spots and represent the most vulnerable regions of Brazil to climate changes (Soito and 
Freitas 2011). 
Furthermore, according to Lucena et.al (2012) the Brazilian electric system is very 
vulnerable to climate change because it is essentially renewable energy based and the 
concentration of the generation only in these sources exposes the system to extreme 
climate events, which can affect the ability of the country to attend the electricity demand.  
However, even renewable energy being more vulnerable, due to its dependence to 
weather and climate, fossil energy supply technologies, though relatively less susceptible 
to variations in environmental conditions, are not totally free from eventual impacts from 
climate change (Schaeffer et al. 2012) as noticed in Arroyo (2012). 
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In spite of the current high share of renewables in the Brazilian energy mix, 
the country faces a situation where, on the one hand, it needs to increase its 
energy production to foster socioeconomic development, job creation and 
poverty alleviation. On the other hand, the country faces the near exhaustion 
of its environmentally feasible hydropower potential and is expected to 
increase fossil energy use, with  the recent oil discoveries in the pre-salt1 fields 
and the perspectives for increased coal-fired power generation (EPE, 2013; 
Nogueira et al., 2014; Saraiva et al., 2014 apud Lucena et al. 2015).  
Additionally, Lucena et.al. (2012) also remember that, along the renewable sources 
vulnerability, because of an increase in environmental restriction to build new big 
reservoirs, the ability to compensate drought periods will decrease when the demand 
increases. 
Moreover, according to Losekann (2015c), Brazil has a high risk of getting another 
electricity rationing, although, as presented in the Appendix B, the demand of 2015 
showed itself below the expected one, even inferior to the previous year, which could be 
related to: 
• Residential consumption: family income dropped down and the electricity is more 
expensive so, the consumption decreased; 
• Industrial consumption: demand reduction increased the stocks and industries are 
not producing as much as before so, the electricity consumption decreased; 
• Commercial consumption: increased, but analyzes considered Christmas time so, 
the increase can be temporary.  
Considering the Brazilian power sector dependence on hydro and the impacts of climate 
change on rainfall, evapotranspiration and water availability in general, it is necessary to 
analyze the relationship water x energy. 
In relation to Brazil, the country  
“holds the greatest reserves of surface water on the planet, about 19.4%, and 
one of the world’s greatest potential water resources. However, it is not in a 
comfortable situation in terms of the availability of water resources and the 
location of the demands for its consumable and non-consumable. In fact, about 
90% of the water is found in low-density drainage basins from the Amazon 
and Tocantins rivers, while about 90% of the population is supplied by the rest 
of the country’s water resources” (Soito and Freitas 2011). 
The most relevant characteristic of climate change, with regard to vulnerability and the 
adaptation of water resources, according to Soito and Freitas (2011) is related to 
noticeable alterations in the variability of hydrological systems and extreme events, and 
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not simply to average tendencies in climate change. The authors say that “the occurrence 
of extreme events, such as droughts and floods, more often and more severely will 
increase conflict among water users in the various drainage basins of Brazil” (Soito and 
Freitas 2011). 
In the power sector in Brazil, the hydropower may suffer with the water scarcity in the 
future. The Appendix C presents the level of the 22 main hydroelectric power plants in 
Brazil from 2000 until 2015. These figures show that the current levels of some reservoir 
are similar to the ones observed during the 2001 electric crisis. Considering that the 
hydropower is the main source of electric energy in Brazil it became a matter of concern.  
Additionally, as noted by Lorenzo (2002), the severity of the 2001 situation (2001 energy 
crisis) stems from the fact that, simultaneously to the institutional crisis and the 
progressive increase in the risk in the electrical system, the reservoirs in the Southeast, 
mainly, come for declining for quite some time, reaching a level corresponding to 33% 
of its capacity, when the ideal would be about 90%.  
In 2001, compared to a situation of low rainfall, the reservoirs were reduced to such a low 
level that was instituted a rationing policy. Lorenzo (2002) also argued that the 
consequences of the rationing announced in April of the same year were harmful to the 
population and especially for the production system and that the negative effects would 
be felt for several years. There is, however, a national recognition that the announced 
crisis was not more serious because of the prompt and positive response of society to 
request self-restraint in consumption and the relative economic decline of the country, 
which led to a lower growth of electricity demand by the productive sector (Lorenzo, 
2002). 
Besides, according to Losekann (2013), with the increasing demand and the 
environmental restrictions to build large reservoirs, the regularization capacity of 
reservoirs has dropped from 6 to 5 months in the last decade and will fall to 4 months 
until 2021. 
Moreover, the hydrology is running below the long time average, which created a very 
worrying situation already called “ reservoir crisis” (Losekann 2015c). 
92 
 
Hydro source is present in the power generation mix of 159 countries but more than 50% 
of the total hydro generation in the planet come from five countries: China, Canada, 
Brazil, USA and Russia. However, the importance of hydroelectricity in the power mix 
of each of these countries is different: Brazil and Canada are heavily dependent on hydro 
having more than 50% of hydro generation in its total generation, each; US has less than 
10%; Russia and China have between 10 and 20% (Soito and Freitas 2011). 
Hydro electricity is very important in the Brazilian mix but, with climate change, it is also 
a source of concern. Lucena (2010) pointed out the reduction in the firm energy10 
associated with each basin, which could achieve 80% in some of them (see Table 12). 
Table 12: SUISHI-O model results by Lucena 
Basin Historic Variation in Relation to the Reference 
Scenario 
Average MW* A2 B2 
Firm 
Energy 
Average 
Energy 
Firm 
Energy 
Average 
Energy 
Firm 
Energy 
Average 
Energy 
Amazonas 9425 10628 -36% -11% -29% -7% 
Tocantins Araguaia 7531 10001 -46% -27% -41% -21% 
São Francisco 5026 5996 -69% -45% -77% -52% 
Parnaíba 236 293 -83% -83% -88% -82% 
Atlântico Leste 496 565 -82% -80% -82% -80% 
Atlântico Sudeste 1937 2268 -32% 1% -37% -10% 
Atlântico Sul 1739 2037 -26% 8% -18% 11% 
Uruguai 1715 1996 -30% 4% -20% 9% 
Paraguai 375 426 -38% 4% -35% -3% 
Paraná 22903 29038 -8% 43% -7% 37% 
Total 51382 63247 -31,5% 2,7% -29,3% 1,1% 
Note: Based on the system configuration designed for 2016 (EPE, 2007b). 
*: MWm indicates an amount of energy generated according to the average capacity factor 
Source: Lucena (2010) 
Although the average total energy kept itself almost constant in both, A2 and B2, 
scenarios, the firm energy decreased almost 30%, which means that even though the 
                                                          
10 The concept of firm energy refers to the actual energy guaranteed to be available, i.e. non-interruptible 
energy and power guaranteed by the supplier to be available at all times, except for uncontrollable 
circumstances 
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average system, as a whole, will not suffer much with the climate change, in some periods 
the system will lose a huge amount of its capacity to generate energy Lucena (2010). 
Therefore, when considering the expansion plan for the electric system, Lucena (2010) 
suggested that another source would be needed for complementary purposes and, as it 
would be used for small periods, it should be based in low-cost capital plants, and should 
have good operational / contractual flexibility. 
Another variable that was used is the capacity factor and it was calculated by Lucena 
(2010) and is presented in Table 13. 
Table 13: Changes in the capacity factor 
  Historic A2 B2 
Subsystem Capacity 
Factor 
Variation 
vs 
Reference 
Capacity 
Factor 
Variation 
vs 
Reference 
Capacity 
Factor 
S/SE/CO <30 MW 58.0% -30.7% 40.2% -31.7% 39.7% 
[30; 300] MW 48.5% -34.9% 31.6% -33.9% 32.1% 
>300 MW 44.6% -13.2% 38.7% -11.4% 39.5% 
N/NE <30 MW 58.0% -25.2% 43.4% -15.8% 48.8% 
[30; 300] MW 42.4% -49.4% 21.5% -45.1% 23.3% 
>300 MW 49.6% -48.5% 25.5% -45.9% 26.8% 
Source: Lucena (2010) 
Table 13 presents a significant decrease in the firm capacity factor of the large and 
medium-sized plants in the north and northeast of almost 50%. According with Lorenzo 
(2010), this is a consequence of falling water alterations in climatic scenarios A2 and B2. 
In practice, this means that the amount of energy that can be guaranteed though 
hydroelectric generation is smaller. 
Finally, in order to reduce the vulnerability of the power sector, without backtrack in the 
renewable participation, some mitigation strategies were proposed in the literature and 
those will be discussed in the next topic. 
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Mitigation and Adaptation 
In Brazil, distributed generation, which could be a good mitigation and adaptation 
strategy, according to Losekann (2015c), is not presenting itself very successfully, 
especially because of the costs, which are not interesting to the market. 
However, according to Ferraz (2015b), the resolution 482 made possible to introduce 
microgeneration in the grid and the agreement with National Council of Finance Policy 
states to exclude the microgeneration of the ICMS (tax on the movement of goods and 
services), which is the one that has more weight in the electricity tariff. 
Ferraz (2015a) also says that, the diffusion of solar energy in Brazil has been very slow, 
and this is explained by several reasons. The main one is that solar has more competitive 
advantages when compared to the other sources in the distributed microgeneration, but 
this is a great innovation for the Brazilian electrical sector, historically organized towards 
great projects to be dispatched centrally. So, adopting distributed microgeneration also 
implies a great change of organization and regulation structure. 
Furthermore, according to Ferraz (2015c), the new renewable sources will not just add 
more energy into the grid; they cannot be treated as any other source because of their 
flashing nature, which makes necessary to change all the system. 
As the renewable sources generate energy when they have weather/climate conditions to 
do it and not when the system’s controller decide it, a more robust system and smarter 
transmission and distribution systems are needed. 
Ferraz (2015c) explains how wind and solar energy are going to operate in a very different 
way in Brazil as the solar energy will get in as microgeneration, which will affect the 
distribution. For the last ones, the solar microgeneration is not interesting because the 
companies will become responsible for new functions (they will be required to know how 
much each residence produced and treat the account differently) and will not be paid to 
do that. Besides, the distribution companies will lose profit, after all, as consumers will 
buy less energy to produce their own. 
Besides solar energy, the expansion of wind also represents a good strategy, especially 
because Brazilian natural characteristics offer interesting complementarities between 
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wind and water resources in some regions of the country (more wind when has less 
precipitation and vice-versa), which can help optimize the SIN  operation. 
Another observed strategy in Brazil to assure the supply of future demand is seek to 
“establish agreements with bordering countries looking for regional energy integration” 
and “besides the Binational Itaipu Hydroelectric, involving Brazil and Paraguay, the 
current setup includes interconnections between Brazil and Argentina, Uruguay, 
Venezuela”. Moreover, hydropower inventory studies are being performed in Guyana, 
whose potential is about 7.5 GW” and it is possible “to negotiate a construction of one or 
two power plants in this country to import part of the electricity produced” (Soito and 
Freitas 2011). 
Finally, as pointed by Lucena et al. (2010), “long-term energy planning in Brazil has not 
yet analyzed or assessed the possible impacts of global climate change scenarios on the 
vulnerability of the Brazilian energy system in general, and in its power system in 
particular”. Although, the early pre-reports from the PNE 2050 mentioned climate 
change, the final plan is not ready yet and the way in which climate change will be 
considered in the next energy expansion plan is still unknown. 
As this research aim to evaluate the possible contribution of smart grid to reduce the 
vulnerability of the Brazilian power, sector in the future, the next topic addresses the 
status of smart grid research and implementation in the country. 
Smart Grids in Brazil 
In Brazil, the electric power system is based on big power plants, mostly hydro. As the 
generation is far from the big consumer centers, the utilization of a high voltage 
transmission system for big distances is necessary. Then, the energy is conveyed to the 
distribution system towards the consumer centers, following the classic structure from 
high to medium and finally to low voltage levels.  
Although the generation and transmission systems have a fairly advanced monitoring and 
controlling levels, the majority of the distribution system does not have monitoring, 
control or associated communications networks functions (Pelegrini and Vale 2014). 
In the world, the stakeholders in the electricity sector are facing big changes and fast 
evolutions in the market and environment. In Brazil, where the environment is highly 
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regulated, the companies must live with regulatory uncertainties and prepare strategies to 
mitigate risks including the implementation of new technologies (Pelegrini and Vale 
2014), as smart grids. 
Knowing that each country or region has its own reasons and motivations to implement 
smart grids. The Brazilian’s motivations for smart grid reflect the stakeholders’ reality 
which were summarized by Pelegrini and Vale (2014): 
• Possibility to reduce the operational costs of the system due to an increase in the 
operational efficiency because of the automation of internal processes and 
development of system management provided by a greater monitoring and control 
of all agents involved in the operation; 
• Expectation of better management of company assets, from the better 
maintenance policies and replacement of these assets based on the use of tools 
that enable planning of maintenance based on the actual condition of the 
equipment; 
• Consequence of the society’s requirements for more quality in the energy supply; 
• Opportunity to protect the income and fight the losses, especially the non-
technical ones, which are very high in the country. 
According with the Brazilian Industrial Development Agency and Institute of the 
Association of Proprietary of Business Infrastructure and Private Telecommunications 
Systems (apud Pelegrini & Vale, 2014) there are more than 200 projects about smart 
grids, which involves 450 institutions, 300 suppliers, 126 research centers, 60 power 
sector utilities, ministries, regulatory agencies and universities. 
Furthermore, in Brazil, the smart grid pilot projects can be divided in ten subthemes 
according to Pelegrini and Vale (2014): 
• Smart meter; 
• Distribution automation; 
• Storage systems; 
• Electric vehicles; 
• Telecommunications; 
• Information technology; 
• Smart buildings and houses; 
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• New services; and 
• Others (related to costumers, IP, cybernetic security, asset management, among 
others). 
In Brazil, some pilot projects are under development to study the market in relations to 
some smart grid’s technologies and Table 14 presents the main pilot projects under 
development in Brazil. 
Table 14: Main smart grid pilot projects in Brazil 
Name Local Utility Goal Intention 
Smart city Búzios/RJ Ampla Utility 
Validation and 
replicability 
The utility aims to build the first smart 
city of the Latin America 
Smart grid 
program 
Barueri e 
Vargem 
Grande 
Paulista/SP 
AES 
Eletropaulo 
utility 
Validation and 
replicability 
The program, aims to evaluate a smart 
grid in a representative scenario of the 
utility area aiming to replicate the 
model to other serviceable areas. 
InovCity Aparecida/SP 
EDP 
Bandeirante 
Creation of a 
sustainable 
smart grid 
model with 
national 
visibility 
The utility's aim is the operational cost 
reduction and model replication to 
other Brazilian cities; however, the 
replicability depends on consumer 
engagement and Brazilian regulation 
about smart grids 
Cities of 
the Future 
Sete 
Lagoas/MG 
Cemig utility 
Validation and 
replicability 
The region was selected for having a 
favorable electric system and 
communication, diversified market 
and for representing a sample of the 
utility market. 
Parintins 
project 
Parintins/AM 
Eletrobras 
utility 
Creation of a 
sustainable 
smart grid 
model with 
national 
visibility 
The region was selected for having an 
off-grid power system, which favors 
tests on distribution grid under stress 
situations. The utility aims to observe 
the new technologies from generation 
to consumption of electricity, besides 
the consumption behavior, and to 
replicate the pilot project to other 
serviceable areas 
Fernando 
de 
Noronha 
project 
Fernando de 
Noronha/PE 
Companhia 
Energética de 
Pernambuco 
(CELPE) 
Creation of a 
sustainable 
smart grid 
model with 
national 
visibility 
It has been selected a region which has 
high environmental restrictions, an 
off-grid power system, and harsh 
conditions as high temperature and 
salinity. The utility aims to build a 
smart grid on a controlled and high 
environmental restrictions area to 
evaluate the real contributions and 
problems elapsed, including 
sustainability, security, energy quality 
and energy efficiency aspects. 
Paraná 
smart grid 
Curitiba/PR 
Companhia 
Paraense de 
Energia 
(COPEL) 
Validation and 
replicability 
The region was selected for having a 
high-density population and for 
representing a sample of the utility 
market. 
Note 1: More detailed information in the Appendix D. 
Source: Redes Inteligented Brasil, 2015 and Di Santo et al. 2015 
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According to (ANEEL 2010), some technological changes (technological migration 
related with smart meters) are already happening. However, ANEEL emphasizes that 
these new meters are not able to provide additional features that would allow a full 
development of smart grid and can became obsolete after few years. That is happening   
because of the lack of incentives and coordination of this migration, inducing distributors 
to adopt their individual solutions to their particular problems. 
Smart grid is expected to increase electricity reliability by, among other ways, increasing 
the flexibility of the system. System flexibility and smart grid approaches are expected to 
contribute for the integration of intermittent sources. For instance, in Ireland, it was 
estimated to facilitate real-time penetrations of wind up to 75% by 2020 (EirGrid, 2010 
apud IEA 2011). The problem with wind intermittency in Brazil was already pointed as 
one of the main reasons why wind is not being properly introduced in the country’s grid. 
Besides the intermittent sources integration, other projections were already made in Brazil 
and some other countries. The projections of the Working Group on Smart Grids (2010) 
are summarized in Table 15. 
Table 15: Projections for the Smart Grids Benefits 
Assumption  Values Author Comments 
Reduction of 
peak 1 
Reduction 
of 5-10% 
British regulator 
OFGEM, 2006 
From the potential of consumers to save energy by 
applying hourly tax. There are inaccuracies in this 
estimate and the evidence for this finding is not strong. 
Average 
reduction of 
3.5% in a 
year 
Northern Ireland 
– study about the 
impact over 
energy 
efficiency, 
OFGEM, 2006 
3 different hourly taxes were used during 4 periods. The 
night peak could be reduced until 10% according with 
the price. A high level of consumer satisfaction was 
reported in the trial, with monetary savings calculated 
from 1.5% for the average, up to 15% for some 
consumers. 
Reduction 
of 15% 
U.S. Department 
of Energy 
Use of a sophisticated system that responds to simple 
instructions set by the consumer. Consumers reduced 
about 10% in their bills. Enabled the grid, which was 
previously saturated, serves for a further period of 3 to 
5 years of peak load growth. 
Average 
reduction of 
13% during 
peak 
California, 
Brattle Group, 
2007 
Used different tax during 3 years by 3 utilities. The 
reduction of 13% happened during the 6 months of 
summer time (from May to September). Consumers 
who had an intelligent thermostat reduced their load by 
27% and those who had the gateway system reduced 
their load of 43%.  Based on the uncertainties of 
behavior the study used Mont Carlo to have a solid 
result and by doing that generated an estimated 
maximum demand reduction by 5%. 
 Brazil, Copel, 
1998 
229 consumers. Used an increase in the tax during peak 
and a decrease out of peak. The pilot project showed 
that 70% of consumers made a beneficial behavior 
change because of the tax change. 
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Reduction 
of 
500W/cons
umer 
Guarulhos – SP, 
Brazil, 
Bandeirante, 
1998 
2354 (>250 kWh/month) consumers used a 
differentiated tax and a Two Way Automatic 
Communication System – TWACS.  
Reduction of 
non-technical 
losses 2 
Reduction 
of 4,73% in 
4 years 
Ampla, Brazil A distributor utility implemented smart meters in 
regions with very high losses levels. Besides the use of 
smart meters Ampla also concentrated the 
measurement, armored electrical networks and raised 
the low voltage cables. 
Reduction of 
losses 3 
Reduction 
of 9,6% in 
low voltage 
 Nowadays the technical losses represents 28 TWh/year, 
or 7,3% of all electric energy injected into the grid. By 
assuming a reduction of 5% during peak and 1% in total 
consumption and using the regulated methodology 
available in Módulo 7 do PRODIST was possible to 
calculate the reduction. 
 8% Brattle Group, 
2007 
The study “The Power of Five Percent - How Dynamic 
Pricing Can Save $35 Billion in Electricity Costs” 
shows that a reduction of 5% in the demand would 
reduce the losses by 8% 
Reduction in 
the total 
consumption 
1% Brazil, Working 
Group on Smart 
Grids 
Change in consumers behavior by the use of seasonal 
rates 
1 The Working Group on Smart Grids adopted a peak reduction of 5% and a total consumption reduction 
in low voltage of 1% in order to have a conservative approach. 
2 The Working Group on Smart Grids to estimate how much the non-technical losses would be reduced was 
adopted a procedure that examined non-technical losses in each of the distributors in the country, 
considering: the current level of losses; the combat actions already taken; and the social reality of each 
concession area. See Table 17 for more information on the assumptions for non-technical losses. 
3 The Working Group on Smart Grids considered that a demand during peak reduction of 5% and a total 
demand reduction of 1% is the same as a 9% reduction of technical losses in low voltage; 1,2% reduction 
in medium voltage, which means a total reduction from 7,27% to 7,20%. 
Source: Working Group on Smart Grids (2010) 
Tables 14 and 15 presented the estimated benefits of smart grids implementation in some 
countries, including Brazil. However, it is not possible yet to see if these benefits are 
enough to adapt the sector to climate changes or to reduce the GHG emission per MW 
produced, as it has been increasing during the last years. Besides, Borba et al. (2012) 
concluded that the mitigation potential identified in the country was not large enough, in 
absolute terms, to reduce energy-related GHG emissions below the current level in Brazil 
by 2030. 
In this research it was decided to use conservative values for smart grid’s benefits, 
following the assumptions adopted by the Working Group on Smart Grids (2010). 
In relation to the non-technical losses, Table 16 presents the relation between system 
losses and the projected improvements in non-technical losses, after implementing smart 
grids in Brazil. 
Table 16: Projections for non-technical losses reduction 
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Currently Losses Losses after Smart Grid Number of Distributors 
< 3,5% Stay the same 33 
[3,5%; 5%] 3,5% 03 
[5%; 6%] 4,5% 04 
[6%; 8%] 5,5% 08 
[8%; 10%] 7% 03 
[10%; 15%] 9% 02 
> 15% 10% 07 
Source: Working Group on Smart Grids (2010) 
The numbers presented in Table 17 values result from a study involving a group of 48 
distributions companies (out of 6311). Table 17 presents the final results of this analysis. 
Table 17: Projections for non-technical losses reduction considered 100% penetration of smart gridws in 
this 48 distributions companies market 
Currently 
Losses 
Losses after 
Smart Grid 
Number of 
Distributors 
Currently 
Losses 
(Thousands 
of R$)1,2 
Losses after 
Smart Grid 
(Thousands of 
R$)1,2 
Currently 
Losses 
(TWh) 1 
Losses after 
Smart Grid 
(TWh) 1 
< 3,5% Stay the 
same 
30 1.118.050 1.118.050 4,916 4,916 
[3,5%; 5%] 3,5% 5 172.501 154.264 1,653 1,448 
[5%; 6%] 4,5% 2 89.847 71.586 0,670 0,565 
[6%; 8%] 5,5% 2 59.429 44.579 1,407 1,061 
[8%; 10%] 7% 0 - - - - 
[10%; 15%] 9% 3 93.276 69.990 2,560 1,951 
> 15% 10% 6 194.546 113.061 7,843 4,801 
Total  48 1.727.649 1.571.531 19,049 14,741 
Difference   -9,04% -22,62% 
Total Reduction   156.118 4,308 
Note 1: Base year 2015 
Note 2: Sum of the individual losses of each company in this group 
                                                          
11 The limitation is due to lack of data from other companies. 
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Lastly, even with the expected good results, the implementation of smart grids presents 
some challenges (ANEEL 2010): 
• Integration of distributed generation and renewable sources in the grid; 
• Development and patronization of smart grid technologies; 
• Utilization of demand side management; 
• Development of market technologies; 
• Demand response technologies; 
• Socio-economic and tax analysis; 
• Laboratory tests and certification for all the different new technologies; 
• Initiatives of demonstration projects; 
• Professional capacitation, training and qualification; 
• Definition of funding sources; 
• Telecommunication structure; 
• Society awareness. 
Smart grid scenarios’ synthesis 
The scenarios description and characteristics were presented during the explanation, 
which took place along the Chapters III and IV. However, to facilitate the interpretation, 
a digest version is presented below. 
Table 18 presents the combination of settings considered to define each scenario, the 
years analyzed, and the code used for each of them. 
Table 18: Scenarios used in the case study 
Economic, social 
and technological 
Smart Grids 
Implementation 
Year Acronyms 
Current Account  2015 CA 
Reference   REF 
 Slow 2030 SG_S 
 Moderate 2030 SG_M 
 Fast 2030 SG_F 
Reference A2   REF_A2 
 Slow 2030 A2_SG_S 
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 Moderate 2030 A2_SG_M 
 Fast 2030 A2_SG_F 
Reference B2   REF_B2 
 Slow 2030 B2_SG_S 
 Moderate 2030 B2_SG_M 
 Fast 2030 B2_SG_F 
The variables evolution in each scenario are described below: 
• Population: 
o CA – 205,27 million inhabitants according to the IBGE (Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and Statistics) estimations; 
o Other scenarios – 208 million inhabitants based on Institute of Economic 
and Applied Research projections 
• GDP: 
o CA – 1812,28 billion Reais, local current unit according to Brazilian 
central bank; 
o Other scenarios – 3,2% annual growth according to PNE 2030 B2 scenario 
projections; 
• Total Demand:  
o CA: 522,72 TWh according to BEN (EPE/MME 2016) 
o REF: 971 TWh based on the projection presented in the PND 2050 (EPE 
2016) 
o SG scenarios: was considered a reduction of 1% in the total consumption 
based on a conservative projection made by the working group on smart 
grids (2010); 
o A2 scenarios: was considered an increase in residential demand (increase 
of 3,21% per year) and commercial demand (total increase of 19% over 
the projected demand for 2030) due to an increase in use of air conditioner 
– considered the increase of numbers of hot days, so more days in the year 
when the air conditioner will be used, and hotter days, so, more times in 
the same day, the air conditioner will be working; the other sectors were 
not considered in this analysis and the demand was considered the same 
as the REF scenario (Lucena 2010; EPE 2007);  
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o B2 scenarios: was considered an increase in residential demand (increase 
of 2,79% per year) and commercial demand (increase of 4,6% per year). 
Even with an increase in use of air conditioner the B2 scenarios family 
consider a sustainable growth, which implies the implementation of more 
sustainable and efficient equipment, lamps, showers, etc; the other sectors 
were not considered in this analysis and the demand was considered the 
same as the REF scenario (Lucena 2010; EPE 2007); 
• Losses: 
o CA: 15,11% according to EPE BEN 2016 
o REF: 14,29% based on the projection presented in the PND 2030; 
o SG scenarios: was considered a reduction in the total losses based on Table 
17, in this chapter, based in the projected reductions made by Working 
Group on Smart Grids (2010); 
• Imports: 
o CA: 34,273 TWh according to EPE BEN 2016 
o Other scenarios: sufficient energy to attend the demand considering the 
expected technical and non-technical losses; 
More information about the variables evolution and projection see Appendix F. 
Now that all the scenarios information was given, the next topic presents the results of 
this research. 
Impacts of Smart Grids as an adaptation and mitigation strategy 
After evaluating smart grid’s technologies as a GHG reduction option, the baseline 
scenario was developed estimating GHG emissions, assuming that current development 
trends continue, and no actions are undertaken to explicitly reduce these emissions. The 
next phase considers the alternative GHG mitigation scenarios, as explained before. 
Figures 20 to 29 presents a synthesis of the core features of the Brazilian energy sector 
projected for 2030 as well as the main results obtained in this research. 
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Figure 20: Installed Capacity by Source – present and 2030 
The increase in the installed capacity took into consideration the projections presented by 
PNE 2030 and the annual PDE’s projections and the real values, i.e., which was really 
build out of what was planned. 
 
Figure 21: Generation by source 2030 
Figure 21 presents the projected decrease in Hydro generation from the reference scenario 
to the A2 and B2 scenarios due to reduction of capacity factor and firm energy. The 
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Scenario A2 has a small difference in hydro generation when compared to the scenario 
B2 (A2 324,8 TWh and B2 334,3 TWh). 
 
Figure 22: Total Demand in 2015 and 2030 
In Figure 22, the demand can be separated into 3 groups: the middle one is the Reference 
scenario; the A2 group (lines in the top) projected a demand much higher as it anticipates 
a large increase of air conditioner use in residential and commercial sectors; and the B2 
group (bottom lines) presents the smaller demand as it considers the use of more efficient 
electrical equipment even considering the increase in air conditioner use. According to 
these results, the transition to smart grids does has a negligible impact on the total 
demand. 
 
 Figure 23: Projection of need of electricity imports in 2030 per scenario 
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Even considering the decrease in hydro generation the need to import electricity is smaller 
in the B2 scenarios than it is in the reference scenario due to the demand reduction. The 
use of smart grids decreases even more the need of importing energy.  
However, it is important to remember that the need to import electricity does not 
corresponds to the real importation as, for example, it would be better to import electricity 
from the Paraguayan part of Itaipú Binational than produce it from thermal generation as 
it is less expensive and clean12.  
In what concerns the emissions, Figure 24 shows the direct and indirect (without counting 
twice the same emission) GHG emissions represented in CO2 equivalent 100-years GWP 
(global warming potential). 
 
Figure 24: Projected CO2 equivalent emission by scenario 
As shown by Figure 24, the emissions are very similar in all the scenarios with the 
exception of the B2 group. As the A2 and the REF groups work with the exhaustion of 
the system as the capacity is not enough to attend the increasing demand.   
                                                          
12 Regarding electricity, almost all imports correspond to the purchase of the part of Itaipú Binacional's 
energy from Paraguay, which represented 5.8% of the electricity supply in the SIN in 2014 (EPE/MME 
2015a). 
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Figure 25: Calculated emissions by sector - 2015 
Figure 25 presents the estimated emissions for 2015, in order to compare it to the ones 
presented in Figure 26. 
Figure 26: Projected emissions by sector – 2030 
Figure 26 shows the emission by sector. There is a slightly difference when comparing 
the same sector between the scenarios. This difference is due to the projected final energy 
mix for each scenario. 
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The next figures, Figure 27 to 45, present the historical evolution followed by the 
projected one: generation by scenario, demand by sector and emission obtained as a result 
from the LEAP analysis. 
 
Figure 27: Historical plus projected hydro generation by scenario 
 
Figure 28: Historical plus projected wind generation by scenario 
 
Figure 29: Historical plus projected solar generation by scenario 
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Figure 30: Historical plus projected sugar cane bagasse generation by scenario 
 
 
Figure 31: Historical plus projected other renewable generation by scenario 
 
Figure 32: Historical plus projected natural gas generation by scenario 
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Figure 33: Historical plus projected steam coal generation by scenario 
 
 
Figure 34: Historical plus projected fuel oil generation by scenario 
 
Figure 35: Historical plus projected nuclear generation by scenario 
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Figure 36: Historical plus projected other non-renewable generation by scenario 
By the figures presented, one can see that some sources will have the same output no 
matter the scenario. Nuclear, for example, is better to keep producing as a base source 
than to use as back up. The same happened with solar and wind, as they generate 
electricity when have natural conditions. Otherwise, hydro will suffer from climate 
change and presents itself in two groups, as it was considering as a base source of energy. 
According to the model projections, the coal, fuel oil and other non-renewable are 
expected to decrease. That was a positive result as in the national plan it is also expected 
to decrease but, with climate change effects and smart grids’ impacts, the use was 
expected to decrease in a different speed.  
Furthermore, natural gas is expected to increase, as related emissions are smaller for this 
source, as well as its maintenance and operation costs, when compared to other thermal 
concurrent. 
 
Figure 37: Historical plus projected residential sector demand 
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Figure 38: Historical plus projected industrial sector demand 
 
Figure 39: Historical plus projected transportation sector demand 
 
In the transportation sector, it wasn’t considered a big increase due to electric vehicles as 
Brazil is a leader in ethanol production and already has hybrid and 100% ethanol powered 
cars. 
 
Figure 40: Historical plus projected agriculture and livestock sector demand 
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Figure 41: Historical plus projected commercial sector demand 
 
Figure 42: Historical plus projected public-sector demand 
 
 
Figure 43: Historical plus projected energy sector demand 
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Figure 44: Historical plus projected total demand 
As  mentioned before, the projections for the demand only considered the effects of 
climate change on residential and commercial sectors demand for air conditioner and it 
created a limited area with A2 group as the worst scenario, B2 group as the best one and 
reference group in between. 
 
Figure 45: Historical plus projected GHG emissions 
From Figure 45, one can notice that the GHG emissions are expected to be very similar 
during the first years, regardless the scenario (even in the reference group of scenarios 
where climate change effects are not considered, and hydro availability is higher). 
However, in the end of the analyzed period, i.e., when smart grids are expected to be fully 
integrated, the B2 group separate from the rest and start to decrease its emissions. Figure 
46 seeks to highlight the difference between the scenarios presenting only the last five 
years of the projection period obtained with the use of the model. 
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Figure 46: Highlight in the historical plus projected GHG emissions – between 2025 and 2030 
The graphic in Figure 46 contains five lines: the three lines with lower emissions are the 
B2 group with smart grids; the fourth line with lower emission corresponds to the scenario 
B2 without smart grids; the top line is, in fact, six different scenarios overlapping, the 
reference group and the A2 group, with and without smart grids. 
The last figure represents the capacity needed to attend the total demand but not 
dispatched. 
 
Figure 47: Capacity needed to attend the total demand but not dispatched 
In this case, the result are two very different groups, where the A2 group has very high 
values when compared to the rest of scenarios. 
Considering the equation presented by Sathaye and Ravindranath (1998): 
CO2 emissions = population * GDP per capita[R$/people] * energy 
intensity[TWh/R$] * carbon intensity[CO2/TWh] 
When applied to this research it is possible to conclude that, based on Table 19: 
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Table 19: Results of Sathaye and Ravindranath Indicators for each scenario  
Energy intensity Carbon intensity 
CA 0,321 0,1288 
REF 0,343 0,0892 
SG_S 0,343 0,0892 
SG_M 0,343 0,0892 
SG_F 0,343 0,0892 
REF_A2 0,295 0,1038 
A2_SG_S 0,295 0,1038 
A2_SG_M 0,295 0,1038 
A2_SG_F 0,295 0,1038 
REF_B2 0,296 0,0999 
B2_SG_S 0,293 0,0933 
B2_SG_M 0,292 0,0918 
B2_SG_F 0,290 0,0892 
 
When considering the indicator of nation’s aggregate energy intensity, considering that 
there is no change in the composition of GDP, all changes observed in table are due to 
technology and efficiency. Therefore, as presented, only the B2 scenarios show an 
improvement in this indicator as it considers not only smart grid but also other 
technological changes to increase efficiency. The scenarios that only considers smart 
grids do not show any difference between the reference scenario and the smart grids 
scenarios (this difference appears in the energy needs for imports). 
In what concerns the carbon intensity indicator, the same can be observed, only the B2 
group of scenarios show any difference between the smart grids scenarios and the 
reference scenario. 
Moreover, smart grids are also expected to reduce losses. Figures 48 to 50 presents the 
projected reduction for each scenario. 
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Figure 48: Technical and Non-Technical losses reduction 
 
As expected, the smart grids help to reduce the losses, technical and non-technical, and 
Figure 48 presented the total losses reduction. In all scenarios groups the reduction, when 
compared to the reference climatic scenario from each group, increases with the increase 
in smart grids penetration. 
Figure 49 shows losses monetization for the currently case and for the projected scenarios 
in 2030. 
 
Figure 49: Monetary costs related to electricity losses by the use of smart grids 
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For a matter of comparison, Figure 49 presents two values for the current cost for 
electricity losses, the real value, presented by ANEEL (2016) and the values estimated 
using the model.  
For the groups of scenarios, the costs decrease as the penetration of smart grids increase. 
Figure 50 presents how much could be saved by implementing smart grids, comparing 
the expected losses from each smart grid scenario with its own reference scenario (how 
much would be lost in a reference scenario but could be saved by implementing smart 
grids technology). 
 
Figure 50: Total financial saved by using smart grids 
 
As expected, as faster the implementation, higher would be the total amount of money 
saved by electricity distributions companies by using smart grids. 
Furthermore, in what concerns the financial analysis, Figure 51 compares the costs of 
each reference scenario, costs for adding new installed capacity to attend the not 
dispatched electricity in 2030, to the same climate scenario with smart grids. 
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Figure 51: Projected reduction in needed installed capacity after 2030 
 
 Finally, Figure 52 shows the operation and maintenance costs for each scenario in 2030 
according to the, already presented, installed capacity, generation mix, demand to be 
attended and expected losses. 
 
Figure 52: Projected OM costs in 2030 
 
The operation and maintenance costs for the REF scenario group are the highest ones and 
the lowest one in the B2_SG_F scenario, while the A2 group stays in the middle. 
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Discussion 
The results achieved with LEAP model shown that smart grids can help with climate 
change mitigation and adaptation, but these results are better when associated with a 
sustainable growth, i.e., change of obsolete domestic equipment for more efficient ones, 
changing lamps for others more efficient, changing electric shower for gas shower, etc. 
Given the large hydro share, the energy sector in Brazil is not a sector with a large 
potential to reduce the GHG emission below the current level, i.e., presents a small 
mitigation capacity. However, it still need to adapt to future level of water available to 
generate electricity, in order to reduce the vulnerability of the sector. Nevertheless, the 
increase in renewable generation is not the only way to mitigate the energy sector; the 
consumption reduction and smart grid implementation can also contribute to this goal, 
not only by reducing the demand, but, especially, by reducing the losses. 
Additionally, by reducing the losses (technical and non-technical), the electricity costs 
will also diminish, inducing tariffs decrease, as the final consumer pays for the losses.  
Besides reducing the tariffs, another co-benefit from implementing smart grids is the 
creation of new industries, services and jobs as well as the increase in gross domestic 
product. 
Even considering that Brazilian and EUA electricity mix are very different, it can be 
expected that smart grid could make the electricity sector more competitive and create 
new industries, services and jobs as pointed by Hamilton and Summy (2011). 
It is important to keep in mind that the goal of this study was never to exactly predict the 
future of climate change or energy sector but to analyze, for different future probable 
scenarios, the impact of smart grids to mitigate and adapt the sector.  
During this research, the power sector generation and consumption were characterized, 
the future of the sector, its vulnerability and the competitiveness of each source were 
addressed. The results presented by the LEAP model created showed that smart grids are 
able to contribute to increase the participation of renewable sources even with climate 
change conditions, especially solar and wind as the implementation of both sources 
suffers as the grid was not built to support them. 
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The intermittency of solar and wind sources requires a more robust system and smarter 
transmission lines. In Brazil the solar sources are mainly connected to the low voltage 
level (microgeneration); then, it affects the distribution system, as it has to adapt to 
thousands of micro generators sending energy to the network. 
Furthermore, the wind energy has already started on a large scale in Brazil (it has been 
winning many energy auctions) and there is a challenge for the transmission industry to 
integrate an intermittent source that arrives on a large scale. The problem started when 
wind energy started to be introduced in Brazil as it was treated as an additional source (as 
the other sources used in the country – hydro with dam, thermal and nuclear) without 
considering the intermittency. 
The simulation tests performed show that the best mitigation and adaptation results came 
from the B2 group of scenarios, which represent, not only the changes in climate, but also 
the changes in society (awareness about environmental issues, use of more efficient 
equipment, sustainable growth…) 
Finally, smart grid would also help to reduce electricity tariffs by increasing the ability of 
the grid to take the most of Brazilian natural characteristics that gives the country great 
winds, insolation and water to small13 power plants. The grid is not prepared to work with 
intermittent sources and domestic micro generation, so, smartening the grid would create 
the environment to helping use cheaper renewable energy, i.e., reduce the tariffs and 
walking, as close as possible, to a completely renewable system. 
 
                                                          
13 There is a paradox involving hydropower, as there is some divergent opinion about how clean this 
source really is. The hydroelectric dams generate a surprising amount of greenhouse gas emissions, 
especially methane, and those gases are not accounted by global greenhouse gas inventories. CO2 and 
CH4 emissions from hydropower result from the oxic/anoxic decomposition of the flooded organic matter 
from different sources within the reservoir (e.g. vegetation and soils, macrophytes, and algae produced 
in the reservoirs) and from outside the reservoir (e.g. sedimentary OM input from the upstream river 
basin) (de Faria et al. 2015). In a research conducted by Faria et al. (2015) most of the simulated emission 
factors for Cachoeira dos Patos, Cachoeira do Caí, and Sinop are higher than those from thermal power 
plants. In Faria et al. (2015) research, they concluded that hydroelectric plants installed or planned to be 
built in the Amazon can be as or more polluting than thermoelectric plants. Eighteen new reservoirs could 
emit up to 21 million tons of methane and 310 million tons of carbon dioxide. As methane is 32 times 
more potent greenhouse gas than CO2, the emissions can reach up to 982 million tons of CO2e or, in a 
optimistic scenario, 369 million tons. 
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CHAPTER V: FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Conclusion 
This research presented an analysis of the potential of smart grid’s technologies to 
mitigate and adapt the power sector to expected climate change. In order to achieve that, 
three groups of scenarios were considered: Reference, A2 and B2 scenarios, each one 
containing three levels of smart grid penetration, named as Slow, Moderate and Fast. 
Finally, an integrated model of the electric system was used to simulate the future 
generation for each scenario, the emissions and the impact of smart grid. 
The presented approach was demonstrated by a case study in the power sector in Brazil, 
which differs from other countries power sectors because of large participation of 
renewable sources, mainly hydro and, as a consequence, a small potential to lower the 
current GHG emissions. 
Thus, by considering the firm energy and capacity factor projection for the A2 and B2 
scenarios, a model was created to simulate the future generation with the climate change 
impacts in temperature and precipitation. After that, mitigation scenarios were formed to 
simulate the demand, generation and GHG emission in the power sector. This analysis 
was based on the LEAP model. This model has some advantages when applied to the 
research in developing countries, as it has a low initial data requirement and those 
countries usually presents some lack of data. Nevertheless, it is also possible to add 
complexity only where data is available and where it provides further useful insights into 
the questions being addressed. 
The results show that smart grids can help save energy by reducing losses in all climate 
scenarios. In the B2 group, smart grids can also contribute to mitigate the sector by 
reducing GHG emission, as this scenario also consider the use of more efficient 
equipment and a more conscious society. The A2 scenario presents a situation where the 
consumption is higher due to increase of number of hot days and temperature, which will 
increase the use of air conditioner in residential and commercial sectors. However, there 
is no large expected change for more efficient equipment and no awareness of the 
population (who stated in a ANEEL research on smart grid that “they do not know what 
it is, they are not interested in that and do not want to pay more to have it”). 
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Additionally, the B2 scenario, even with a decrease in hydro generation, still having the 
least GHG emission, yet when compared to the reference scenario, which did not consider 
the climate change effects and still had a high hydro participation in 2030. 
The smart grids also proved its potential to reduce the operational and maintenance costs 
and the investments in new power plants after 2030. 
Recommendations and Future work 
This research was focused on the SIN, which means the Brazilian national interconnected 
system, which covers almost the entire country. However, it would be interesting to 
analyze the impact, adaptation and mitigation measures within each region of the country 
(the regions could be the five geographical, the 4 SIN regions plus the isolated system or 
the basis regions) in order to adapt the solution to the characteristics and needs of each 
one. Brazil in a continental country and a general solution may not have the same 
impact/results in each region. 
However, considering the particularities of the system, in some cases, a research focused 
on a particular power plant could be required. 
Use of WEAP (Water Evaluation and Planning System), a tool created by Stockholm 
Environment Institute, which can help with integrated energy planning studies and could 
offer better results for Brazil as it operates on the basic principle of a water balance. It 
can simulate sectoral demand, water conservation, water rights and allocation priorities, 
surface flow and groundwater recharge from precipitation, reservoir operations, 
availability for hydroelectric power generation, Energy demands, pollution control of 
water quality, assessment of vulnerabilities and characteristics of aquatic ecosystems, and 
financial cost-benefit analyzes of projects. Finally, this tool helps on the establishment of 
preventive management strategies for the multiple use of water in several scenarios 
through the basic principle of water balance (LEAP and Ennergy Community n.d.). 
A research on the acceptance of smart grids for consumers and the engagement of society 
on embracing a new technology and a new way to buy and use electricity would also be 
necessary as the B2 projections rely on, not only government, but the country 
engagement. 
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Appendix A: Synthesis of the Energy Sector 
This appendix synthetizes the main data on energy including energy production, by 
source, domestic supply, electricity generation and GHG emission.    
 
Figure 53: Primary Energy Production 
Source: Data from BEN (EPE/MME 2016) 
 
Figure 54: Primary Energy Production by Source 
Source: Data from BEN (EPE/MME 2016) 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1
0
^6
 t
o
e
Primary Energy Production
NON-RENEWABLE ENERGY RENEWABLE ENERGY
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
1
0
^6
 t
o
e
Primary Energy Production by Source
  PETROLEUM   NATURAL GAS   STEAM COAL   METALLURGICAL COAL
  URANIUM - U308 OTHER NON-RENEWABLE   HYDRAULIC   FIREWOOD
  SUGAR CANE PRODUCTS OTHER RENEWABLE
137 
 
 
Figure 55: Domestic Energy Supply 
Source: Data from BEN (EPE/MME 2016) 
 
 
Figure 56: Domestic Energy Supply by Source 
Source: Data from BEN (EPE/MME 2016) 
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Figure 57: Electricity Generation 
Source: Data from BEN (EPE/MME 2016) 
 
 
Figure 58: Electricity Generation by Source 
Source: Data from BEN (EPE/MME 2016) 
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Figure 59: GHG emission by electricity sector compared with electricity generated 
Source: Data from BEN (EPE/MME 2016) 
 
 
Figure 60: kg of CO2 emitted by MWh produced 
Source: Data from BEN (EPE/MME 2016) 
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Appendix B: Evolution of the Brazilian Power Sector: data analysis 
Installed Capacity 
The installed capacity can be seen as the maximum amount of electric energy that can be 
produced in the country considering the best conditions scenario. 
In order to better understand the graphics that will be presented some issues must be 
clarified: 
• The hydro installed capacity incudes half of Itaipu Power Plant (the Brazilian part 
of the binational hydro power plant); 
• IEP stands for Independent Energy Producers; 
• IEP plants, traditionally self-producers (SP), are classified as SP14; 
• Solar corresponds to photovoltaic energy; 
• PU is a reference for public utilities power plants. 
First of all, Figure 61 presents the installed capacity by producer type (PU or SP). 
                                                          
14 IEP and SP are treated as different things but, in reality, this difference is very tenuous. SP and IEP are 
defined as being: (1) Independent Energy Producers are legal entities or companies in a consortium that 
receive a concession or authorization to produce electricity destined to trade in all or part of the energy 
produced at their own risk; (2) Self-Producers are natural or legal persons or companies that are members 
of a consortium that receive a concession or authorization to produce electricity for their exclusive use, and 
may, with authorization from ANEEL, sell the surplus electric power generated. Traditionally, the self-
producer was a consumer who owned plants to generate his own energy and could market the surplus. The 
concept of independent producer came with more possibilities of commercial arrangements. Both are 
considered self-producers but can legally be authorized as self-producers or as independent 
producers(Energybras - Energias Renováveis n.d.). 
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Figure 61: Total PU, IEP and SP installed capacity from 1974 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
It can be seen that the PU are responsible for the majority of the installed capacity in the 
country, however, the SP are increasing its participation since 2000, and more especially 
2005, the period of model transition in Brazil. 
Figures 62 to 67 presents the same information as Figure 61 but separated by source of 
energy. 
 
Figure 62: Hydro installed capacity from 1974 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
Figure 62 shows that PU play an important role in the hydro installed capacity as it is 
almost all from public utilities. 
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Figure 63: Thermal installed capacity from 1974 until 2014  
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
Figure 63 shows that PU and SP are not very distant in the participation in thermal 
installed capacity. 
 
Figure 64: Wind Installed capacity from 1974 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
In what concerns about wind installed capacity, Figure 64 shows that it is almost only 
PU. 
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Figure 65: Solar installed capacity from 1974 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
The solar installed capacity still very recent in the country and its small installed capacity 
have not a big difference in participation when comparing PU and SP. 
 
Figure 66: Nuclear installed capacity from 1974 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
Finally, the nuclear installed capacity, which is all PU and represents the two nuclear 
power plants in Brazil. 
The next figure, Figure 67, presents the total installed capacity in Brazil but its data is 
divided by source in order to see the importance of each source for the national electric 
energy mix. 
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Figure 67: Total installed capacity by source from 1974 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
From Figure 67 and from the first sector of this report it is possible to confirm that the 
hydro source is the main source of electric energy in the country followed by thermals, 
which assures the security of supply in a water scarcity scenario. It is also possible to see 
that thermal installed capacity participation is growing faster since 2001. 
Figure 68 and 69 presents the participation of each source of electricity in the installed 
capacity of each kind of producer. 
 
Figure 68: PU and IEP installed capacity by source from 1974 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
The configuration of Figure 68 is not very different of the previous one because of the 
huge participation of PU compared to SP, which could be seen in Figure 61.  
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Figure 69: SP installed capacity by source from 1974 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
When analyzing only the SP installed capacity the situation is very different with 
predominance of thermals followed by distance for hydro installed capacity which only 
started to grow after 2006. 
Now that an overview of the installed capacity was presented, the next point addresses 
the generation. 
Generation 
In this section the generation corresponds to the total energy produced in the country in 
each year and the input (fuel for thermal power plants) necessary to produce it. 
First, one aspect to be considered is the shape of the load in the country. Figure 70 presents 
the evolution of the daily load curve of the SIN during the summer and winter periods, 
between 2000 and 2014. 
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Figure 70: Evolution of the daily Load Curve of the SIN in Wednesdays during the summer (left) and 
winter (right) from 2000 to 2014 in MW 
Source: EPE/MME 2015 
The analysis of these curves indicates that the consumptions during summer and winter 
are different: the peak, during the winter is around 7pm but during the summer is more 
often between 3pm and 4 pm. Several factors contribute to this difference like the increase 
in air conditioning equipment in the residential and commercial sectors, the management 
of cargo at classic rush hour, changes in the [end] expedient of the commercial sector and 
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some industries, public lighting and, of course, increased distributed generation operating 
at peak hours (EPE/MME 2015b). 
The first figure, Figure 71 represents the yearly total input used by public utilities (PU) 
power plants, from 1970 to 2014, to generate electric energy. 
 
Figure 71: Input in PU power plants from 1970 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
Figure 71 shows that the input is mainly non-renewable, the use of renewable ones only 
started to grow after 2010 and its participation still very insignificant. 
Figure 72 represents the participation of each non-renewable source in the total non-
renewable input. 
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Figure 72: Non-Renewable input in PU power plants from 1974 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
Figure 72 shows that until the year of 2011 the participation of each non-renewable input 
was, more or less, the same. However, after that the natural gas gained much more 
importance for the electricity generation in thermal power plants. 
Figure 73 represents the participation of each renewable source in the total renewable 
input. 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
1
0
^6
 t
o
e
Distribution of Non - Renewable Input in 
Public Utilities Power Plants 
NATURAL GAS
STEAM COAL
DIESEL OIL
FUEL OIL
OTHER NON-RENEWABLE
URANIUM CONTAINED IN
UO2
149 
 
 
Figure 73: Renewable input in PU power plants from 1974 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
When considering the renewable input, Figure 73 shows that firewood is the only 
significant source used, even knowing that the others added up represents much more 
than firewood, each one of them, separately, are not significant. 
In what concerns the energy generated, Figure 74 presents the total amount of electricity 
generated by hydro PU and thermal PU. 
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Figure 74: Participation of hydro and thermal in the PU total generation from 1974 until 2014 – 106 toe 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
From Figure 74 it is possible to see that when the total hydro generation has been 
decreasing, the total thermal generation is growing, especially after 2011. 
The next graphic, Figure 75, presents the total losses by the PU thermal plants. 
 
Figure 75: Losses in PU thermal plants from 1970 to 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
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From Figure 75 it is possible to see that the losses have been increasing fast since 1994 
and especially after 2011. 
Figure 76 shows the average efficiency of PU thermal plants, per year. 
 
Figure 76: Percentage of the PU thermal plants efficiency from 1970 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
Figure 76 shows that the efficiency of the thermal power plants is increasing since 1998, 
even considering the increase in losses. 
Figure 77 presents the participation of renewable and non-renewable sources in the total 
electricity generated yearly. 
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Figure 77: Participation of renewable and non-renewable in the PU total generation from 1974 until 2014 
– TWh 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
As the renewable generation in mainly hydro and the non-renewable is mainly thermal, 
there is no big difference between Figures 77 and 74. 
Figure 78 and 79 presents the participation of each non-renewable and each renewable 
source in the total non-renewable and total renewable generation, respectively. 
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Figure 78: Generation by each non-renewable source in PU from 1970 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
Figure 78 reflects the information presented in Figure 72, and the natural gas, after 2012, 
plays the main role in the non-renewable generation. 
 
Figure 79: Generation by each renewable source in PU from 1970 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
From Figure 79 it is possible to see the importance of hydro generation for Brazil and, 
even with a decrease in after 2011, its participation is much bigger than any other source.  
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As the country counts with some SP Power Plants, they must be also analyzed in terms 
of input and generation. 
Figure 80 represents the yearly total input used by SP power plants, from the 1970’s until 
present days, to generate electric energy. 
 
Figure 80: Input in SP power plants from 1970 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
Very different from Figure 71 Figure 80 shows that SP always have equilibrium between 
the use of non-renewable and renewable input with the non-renewable slightly ahead the 
renewable. However, that changed after 2008 and the renewable input became the most 
used input and the difference between them started to slowly increase. 
Figure 81 represents the participation of each non-renewable source in the total non-
renewable input. 
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Figure 81: Non-Renewable input in SP power plants from 1974 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
As the PU, the SP also increased the use of natural gas recently, but this increase started 
after 2009 and not 2011 as the PU. 
Figure 82 represents the participation of each renewable source in the total renewable 
input. 
 
Figure 82: Renewable input in SP power plants from 1974 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
Figure 82 shows that, for the SP, the sugar cane bagasse is the most used renewable input 
for electricity, followed by black liquor. 
Now, changing from the amount of input used to the energy generated, Figure 83 presents 
the total amount of electricity generated by hydro SP and thermal SP. 
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Figure 83: Participation of renewable and non-renewable in the SP total generation from 1974 until 2014 
- TWh 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
Figure 83 shows the opposite of what Figure 74 presented. The SP generation is mainly 
thermal. 
The next graphic, Figure 84, presents the total losses by the SP thermal plants. 
 
Figure 84: Losses in SP thermal plants from 1970 to 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
As happened with the PU thermal plants, the losses in the SP thermal plants are also 
increasing fast since 1994. 
Figure 85 shows the average percentage of efficiency by year of SP thermal plants. 
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Figure 85: Percentage of the SP thermal plants efficiency from 1970 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
The efficiency of SP thermal plants has always been higher than the PU efficiency and 
even considering that the last one has growing fast it hasn’t exceeded the efficiency 
presented by the SP thermal plants. 
Figure 86 presents the participation of renewable and non-renewable sources in the total 
electricity generated yearly. 
 
Figure 86: Participation of renewable and non-renewable in the SP total generation from 1974 until 2014 
– TWh 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
In the SP case, Figure 86 shows that it is very different from the PU case where the 
participation of renewable and non-renewable is almost the same as the participation of 
thermal and hydro. In this case, even knowing that the thermal participation is much 
higher than the hydro, the renewable participation is much higher than the non-renewable.  
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This situation can be explained by analyzing Figures 87 and 88, the which present the 
participation of each non-renewable and each renewable source in the total non-
renewable and total renewable generation, respectively. 
 
Figure 87: Generation by each non-renewable source in SP from 1970 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
Figure 87 shows, as expected, that the natural gas is the main responsible for electricity 
generation by non-renewable sources. 
 
Figure 88: Generation by each renewable source in SP from 1970 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
Figure 88 shows that sugar cane bagasse is the main renewable source used to generate 
energy, which explain the dominance of non-renewable sources and thermal plants at the 
same time in the SP.   
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It is also interesting to notice that the hydro generation stopped growing and dropped a 
little bit after 2011. 
Finally, the following three graphics, Figures 89, 90 and 91, represent the electric energy 
produced by SP and not injected in the grid. 
Figure 89 shows the amount of energy generated and the amount that was not injected 
into the grid. 
 
Figure 89: SP generation not injected in the grid from 1970 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
Before 1995 the energy that was generated by self-producers was, majority, not injected 
into the grid. However, after 1995 the amount of energy injected in the grid started to 
grow. That is because of the establishment of SINTREL in 1993, as was commented in 
the theoretical overview on the evolution of the sector. 
Figure 90 show the amount of non-renewable electricity generated which was not injected 
into the grid. 
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Figure 90: SP non-renewable generation not injected in the grid from 1970 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
From Figure 90 it is possible to see that almost all non-renewable energy generated wasn’t 
injected into the grid. 
Figure 91 shows the amount of renewable energy generated which was not injected into 
the grid. 
 
Figure 91: SP renewable generation not injected in the grid from 1970 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
From Figure 91 it is possible to see that almost half of the renewable energy generated is 
injected in the grid. Probably because it is easier to sell renewable energy to the grid due 
to alternative energy policies. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
TW
h
Self Producers' Electricity Generated by Non-
Renewable Source Not Injected in the 
Network
NON-RENEWABLE
NON-RENEWABLE NOT
INJECTED IN ELECTRICITY
NETWORK
0
20
40
60
80
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
TW
h
Self Producers' Electricity Generated by 
Renewable Source Not Injected in the 
Network
RENEWABLE
RENEWABLE NOT INJECTED
IN ELECTRICITY NETWORK
161 
 
After address the generation in the past years, the next section will present the reserves 
of energy sources that can be used to generate electricity. 
Reserves 
The reserves are presented in some cases as proved reserves and others as estimated 
reserve and it can be related with the interest to invest or not in a particular type of power 
plant. 
Figure 92 presents the confirmed reserves of petroleum.   
 
Note 1: From 1990 to 1998, criteria adopted from both SPE and WPC, which slightly increased reserves in 
comparison to previous years. From 1999 on values are based on ANP Decree No. 009/2000. 
Note 2: Developing fields are considered. 
Figure 92: Petroleum proved reserves from 1975 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
The petroleum proved reserves have been increasing. 
Figure 93 presents the proved reserves of natural gas.  
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
7
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
3
1
0
9
m
³
Petroleum Proved Reserves
162 
 
 
Note 1: From 1990 to 1998, criteria adopted from both SPE and WPC, which slightly increased reserves in 
comparison to previous years. From 1999 on values are based on ANP Decree No. 009/2000. 
Note 2: Developing fields are considered. 
Figure 93: Natural gas proved reserves from 1975 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
The natural gas reserves have been increasing, however, it had a slightly decrease between 
2003 and 2004. 
Figure 94 presents the inventoried, estimated and total hydraulic potential in the country. 
 
Note 1: Firm energy 
Figure 94: Hydraulic inventoried, estimated and total potential from 1970 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
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As the inventoried potential is growing the estimated one in decreasing, however, the 
decrease was bigger than the growth in the inventoried making the total potential decrease 
after 2004. 
Figure 94 presents the reserves of coal.   
 
Note 1: Includes measured, indicated and inferred reserves. 
Figure 95: Coal reserves from 1974 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
The steam coal and the metallurgical coal reserves are almost constant since 1990. 
Figure 96 presents the reserves of peat. 
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Note 1: Includes measured, indicated and inferred reserves. 
Figure 96: Peat reserves from 1974 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
Since 1984 the reserves of peat are constant. 
Finally, Figure 97 presents the reserves of uranium U3O8. 
 
Note 1: Includes measured, indicated and inferred reserves 
Figure 97: Uranium reserves from 1973 until 2014 
Source: Balanço Energético Nacional, EPE, Ministério de Minas e Energia, 2015 
From Figure 97 it is possible to see that the reserves of uranium are almost constant with 
a slightly increase between 1996 and 1997. 
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This topic aimed to analyze the evolution of Brazilian power industry by theoretical 
review and preliminary data analysis, which can be seen as complementary. 
Besides, the data analysis also pointed that the hydro source is the main source of energy 
used to generate electricity in the country with the bigger participation in both, installed 
capacity and generation. However, its generation has been decreasing in the last years: 
increasing the use of thermal plants, the amount of CO2 emission, the electricity costs and 
decreasing the security of the supply. 
The analysis also pointed to an increase in thermal installed capacity and generation since 
2001 as a consequence of the last electricity crisis; and also, an increase in wind and solar 
(especially wind), as the country has a goal of reducing GHG emissions until 2020. 
Furthermore, this topic also made possible to realize the difference between the electric 
mix between SP and PU, being both very different in what concerns the installed capacity 
and the generation, but one should keep in mind that the PU has a much higher 
participation than SP in the total installed capacity and total generation.  
GHG in Brazil 
GHG or greenhouse gas, according to IPCC (2014),  
“are those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and 
anthropogenic, that absorb and emit radiation at specific wavelengths within 
the spectrum of terrestrial radiation emitted by the Earth’s surface, the 
atmosphere itself, and clouds. This property causes the greenhouse effect. 
Water vapour (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), methane 
(CH4), and ozone (O3) are the primary greenhouse gases in the Earth’s 
atmosphere. Moreover, there are a number of entirely human-made greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere”.  
In what concerns Brazil, even being a Non-Annex I country, which mean that Brazil has 
no binding commitments to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the country 
established the National Policy on Climate Change (PNMC), from the Law 12.187/2009 
(D.O.U. DE 29/12/2009, P. 109 extra edition), which sets the voluntary national 
commitment to adopt mitigation actions in order to reduce their emissions of GHG for 
something between 36.1% and 38.9% compared to projected emissions until 2020. 
According to the Decree 7.390/2010 about the PNMC (D.O.U. DE 10/12/2010, P. 4), 
which regulates the National Policy on Climate Change, the projection of greenhouse gas 
emissions for 2020 was estimated at 3,236 Gt CO2e. Thus, the corresponding reduction 
in the percentage established is between 1,168 Gt CO2e and 1,259 Gt CO2e, respectively. 
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Figures 98, 99 and 100 give a portrayal of the emissions, removal and bunker in Brazil 
related with the following gases: Carbone Dioxide (CO2), Carbon Monoxide (CO), 
Methane (CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N2O), Non-Methane Volatile Organic Compound 
(NMVOC), Nitric Oxide and Nitrogen Dioxide (NOx), Hydrofluorocarbons (they are 
substitutes of the Chlorofluorocarbons HFC – 23, HFC – 125, HFC – 134a, HFC – 143a, 
HFC – 152a), Perfluorocarbons (CF4 and C2F6) and Sulphur Hexafluoride (SF6). The 
values presented in figures are expressed in CO2e t GWP (Tons of Carbone Dioxide 
Equivalent Global Warming Potential). 
 
Figure 98: Total CO2e emissions from 1970 until 2015 in t (GWP) 
Source: SEEG 2015 
 
 
 
Figure 99: Total bunker CO2e emissions from 1970 until 2015 in t (GWP) 
Source: SEEG 2015 
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Bunker corresponds to international maritime and air transport emissions and only 
contributes for energy emissions. As a rule, it should be reported separately as they refer 
to emissions with responsibility for more than one country. 
 
Figure 100: Total CO2e removal from 1970 until 2015 in t (GWP) 
Source: SEEG 2015 
Removal is done by calculating the amount of carbon gases fixed by vegetation growth 
in areas of forests, regeneration of pastures, natural preservation and indigenous territory, 
so, the removal only appears in the data as land use change. 
From Figures 98 to 100 it is possible to conclude that when emissions from land use 
change are decreasing dramatically, the energy and agriculture and livestock emissions 
have been increasing in the last years. It is important to remind that land use change also 
consider indirect emissions from the energy and agriculture and livestock sectors as, the 
construction of power plants (especially the new projects in Amazon), land for biofuels 
and deforestation to expand land for grazing and food production are evaluated as land 
use change. 
For better understand the GHG emissions in the last years see SEEG (n.d.). 
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Appendix C: Evolution of the main reservoirs level 
The reservoirs are separated by river – each graphic correspond to one specific river. 
The values represent the percentage of the reservoir that is full. Besides, it is important to 
consider when analyzing figures that, according to Lorenzo (2002), the ideal level is 90%. 
Another important aspect to consider is that the level of the reservoir does not correspond 
to the level of precipitation in the same period as the reservoir works as a buffer to the 
system, though, the reservoirs usually presents a characteristic seasonal/cyclic variation. 
It is also interesting to remember that the regularization capacity of the reservoirs is 5 
months and it is expected to drop to 4 months until 2021. 
Figures 101 to 110 represents the level of the reservoirs in the power sector, as presented 
by ONS, and can be noticed that the levels are, in many cases, dropping down and in 
some cases, are already empty. 
 
Figure 101: Grande river reservoir levels 
Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico 2015 
 
Figure 102: Paraíba river reservoir levels 
Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico 2015 
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Figure 103: Araguari river reservoir levels 
Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico 2015 
 
Figure 104: Paraná river reservoir levels 
Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico 2015 
 
Figure 105: Tietê river reservoir levels 
Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico 2015 
 
Figure 106: Paranapanema river reservoir levels 
Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico 2015 
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Figure 107: Iguaçu river reservoir levels 
Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico 2015 
 
Figure 108: São Francisco river reservoir levels 
Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico 2015 
 
Figure 109: Almas river reservoir levels 
Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico 2015 
 
Figure 110: Tocantins river reservoir levels 
Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico 2015 
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Appendix D: Smart Grids Pilot Projects 
Table 20: Areas researched by each utility 
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CEMIG – D            N 
CELESC – DIS            S 
AES 
ELETROPAULO 
           
N 
AMPLA            S 
LIGHT            S 
COELCE            N 
COELBA            N 
ELEKTRO            S 
BANDEIRANTE            S 
CPFL-PAULISTA            S 
CEEE-D            S 
AES-SUL            S 
CEB-DIS            N 
CELPA            N 
CELPE            N 
EMG            N 
ESCELSA            S 
CEAL            N 
CEMAR            N 
COPEL-DIS            N 
MANAUS ENERGIA            N 
CELG-D            N 
CERON            N 
CEPISA            N 
COSERN            N 
DEMEI            S 
DMEPC            N 
ELEJOR            N 
ELETROACRE            N 
ELETROCAR            N 
ENERSUL            N 
SULGIPE            N 
 Source: Pelegrini & Vale, 2014 
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Appendix E: Power Sector Expansion Projections 
There are many short time (10 years) energy expansion plans (for every year between 
2015 and 2024 with exception of 2018) besides the medium/long time (25 years) energy 
expansion plan (for 2030) in Brazil. For each plan was made a series of projections 
considering the evolution of social, economic, and technical data and the projections can 
be seen in Figures 111 to 126. The data presented in Figures come from PDE (ten-year 
expansion plan) 2015, PDE 2016, PDE 2017, PDE 2019, PDE 2020, PDE 2021, PDE 
2022, PDE2023, PDE2024 and PNE 2030. 
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Figure 111: Projections for population growth 
 
 
Figure 112: Projections for GDP growth 
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Figure 113: Projections for Residential Demand 
 
 
Figure 114: Projections for Industrial Demand 
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Figure 115: Projections for Transportation Demand 
 
 
Figure 116: Projections for Agriculture and 
Livestock Demand 
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Figure 117: Projections for Commercial Demand 
 
 
Figure 118: Projections for Public Demand 
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Figure 119: Projections for Energy Sector Demand 
 
Figure 120: Projections for Transmission and 
Distribution Losses 
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Figure 121: Projections for Electricity Imports 
 
Figure 122: Projections for Nuclear Installed 
Capacity 
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Figure 123: Projections for Installed Capacity 
Natural Gas 
 
Figure 124: Projections for Installed Capacity 
Sugar Cane Bagasse 
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Figure 125: Projections for Installed Capacity 
Wind 
  
Figure 126: Projections for Installed Capacity 
Hydro 
 
